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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Weeds represent a production constraint in agriculture. Their presence reduces yields 
and thereby producer profitability. However, controlling weeds involves the use of herbicides 
which contribute to nonpoint source pollution. Weed control decisions involve several 
choices which have an impact on nonpoint source pollution. In making weed control 
decisions producers choose both the types and quantities of herbicides they apply, as well as 
the timing and mode of application. Weed control decisions are also tied to the use of other 
inputs which may affect nonpoint source pollution including the use of fertilizers, insecticides, 
fungicides and irrigation water. Furthermore, weed control decisions are made in an uncertain 
environment where crop prices, yield levels, weed infestations, weed damage, and herbicide 
effectiveness are all uncertain. 
There has been considerable study of weed control decisions under uncertainty (e.g., 
Feder 1979, Thornton 1984, Moffitt 1986, Auld and Tisdell 1987, Pannell 1990, Deen et al. 
1993). However, all of the work to date has used an exogenous risk approach. The 
exogenous risk framework assumes that producers are unable to influence the probabilities of 
losses, that the probabilities are entirely determined by 'nature'. Framing weed control 
decisions in this light, we tend to think only of factors that affect the amount of damage 
caused by weeds. However, it is unlikely that a producer takes such a narrow view. Consider 
the factors that have an effect on the probability a crop will be damaged by weeds. This 
probability is affected by such things as the number of weed seeds in the ground, type of weed 
seeds, soil moisture, soil temperature, weather conditions, type of crop planted and seeding 
date, timing and type of tillage operations, and type and timing of herbicide applications. The 
probability of crop damage is clearly affected by human actions. Surely, in making weed 
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control decisions, a producer does not ignore his or her ability to influence the probability of 
suffering a loss. 
An alternative to the exogenous risk approach is the endogenous risk approach. 
Endogenous risk explicitly assumes that producers are able to influence the probabilities of 
risky outcomes. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) were among the first to use an endogenous risk 
framework modeling actions which reduce the size of a loss as self insurance, and actions 
which reduce the probability of a loss as self protection. 
Critics of the endogenous risk approach have argued that outcomes can always be 
defined so that their probability distribution is independent of human actions. However, 
Ehrlich and Becker point out that this distribution is not the relevant distribution a producer 
considers in making economic decisions. In our weed control example, the exogenous risk 
approach argues that we can flindamentally focus on probabilities beyond human control, such 
as the probability that weather conditions will favor weed growth. However, this is not the 
probability a producer is directly concerned with in making weed control decisions. The 
producer is directly concerned with the probability of damage. While we may be able to 
construct a mathematically equivalent model using the exogenous risk approach, framing the 
problem directly in terms of the probability of damage helps us to see what is important to the 
producer in making weed control decisions. 
The endogenous risk approach also shifts our way of thinking about behavior under 
risk. Traditional models have generally tried to explain behavior under risk by assuming 
individuals are risk averse. This assumption was necessary because risk was modeled as being 
linear in probabilities such that risk affects behavior directly through the assumed curvature of 
the utility flinction. However, risk is nonlinear in probabilities using the endogenous risk 
approach, so behavior differs not only across individuals with different risk preferences but 
across individuals with a different marginal productivity of self protection. Therefore, 
3 
behavior is affected by risk even without assuming risk aversion'. Using the endogenous risk 
approach, we can see how the underlying technology to reduce risk affects behavior risk 
rather than trying to explain observed behavior by assuming traditional risk aversion (Shogren 
1991). Shogren and Crocker (1991) indicate that endogenous risk decisions are influenced by 
a combination of tastes and risk reducing technology. To avoid mixing effects, we hold tastes 
constant across individuals assuming risk neutrality and focusing on the effects of differences 
in risk reducing technology, 
Shogren and Crocker (1991) also point out that endogenous risk implies an explicit 
connection between natural science (physical) relationships and social (economic) decisions 
with physical risks affecting economic decisions and economic decisions affecting physical 
risks. However, there has commonly been a separation between physical and social factors in 
scientific and policy discussions. This dissertation attempts to remove this separation by 
incorporating physical relationships with economic decisions. Shogren and Crocker also show 
that, in an endogenous risk framework, general predictions about the effects of risk on 
economic agents' decisions are difficult to make Part of this difficulty arises from the 
generality of their model. They are unable to make use of parameters imposed by the physical 
and economic relationships of a more specific situation. By focusing on the problem of weed 
control we can incorporate agronomic information jn our economic model to make more 
conclusive predictions. 
Specifically, using an endogenous risk framework, this dissertation considers weed 
control decisions as they are affected by uncertainty and as they are affected by policies aimed 
at reducing nonpoint source pollution. There are two main goals to this approach. The first 
goal is to understand how changes in uncertainty lead to shifts in the types and quantities of 
'It is not necessary to use an endogenous risk approach to get this result. By carefijlly 
modeling the underlying technology, Pannell 1990 modeled the effects of uncertainty on weed 
control decisions for a risk neutral producer. 
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herbicides applied and to shifts in the use of other inputs like fertilizer. This allows us to 
understand how weed control decisions may differ across technologies or regions. It also 
indicates how herbicide use might be affected by information about a product's effectiveness. 
The second goal is to understand how policies designed to reduce nonpoint source pollution 
lead to substitutions among inputs. This allows us to more accurately anticipate the physical 
and economic effects of nonpoint source pollution policies. 
An Explanation of the Dissertation Organization 
This dissertation investigates producer's weed control decisions in three papers. 
Following this general introduction, the three papers are presented in the order in which they 
were written preserving the progression of ideas as they evolved. Following the three papers 
is a general summary tying together their implications. A list of references cited in the general 
introduction and general summary follows the general summary. References cited in the 
papers are cited at the end of each paper. 
Although this dissertation is written as three separate papers, they fit together well in 
one work because they all address the same basic problem of modeling weed control 
decisions under uncertainty in a way that captures choices relevant to nonpoint pollution 
policy. All three papers have their roots in the WISH (Weather Impact Simulator Model for 
Herbicides) model which was constructed as a part of the CEEPES (Comprehensive 
Environmental Economic Policy Evaluation System) /atrazine study. WISH was constructed 
to estimate the costs and yields of different weed control strategies given weather uncertainty 
in order to model the effects of banning or restricting the use of atrazine and other triazine 
herbicides (see Johnson et al. 1990, Shogren et al. 1992, Bouzaher et al. January 1993 for a 
description of CEEPES and WISH). The first and second papers capture and extend the basic 
theory of endogenous risk in weed control which is embodied by the WISH model, while the 
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third paper is an applied analysis using WISH and CEEPES to compare the environmental and 
economic effects of alternative nonpoint source pollution policies. 
The first paper, "Nonpoint Pollution, Weeds and Risk", develops a theoretical 
framework for inter-input substitution —modeling substitution between fertilizer and 
herbicides. This paper adapts the theory of self-protection and self-insurance (see Ehrlich and 
Becker 1972, Hiebert 1983) to weed control decisions. The endogenous risk nature of the 
model enables us to capture the choice of which herbicide to apply and substitution between 
herbicide types and fertilizer quantities applied. This is an extension over previous models 
because it uses the distinction between productive inputs and protective inputs (Lichtenberg 
and Zilberman 1986, Carrasco-Tauber and MofFitt 1992) to model substitution between 
quantities of fertilizer and herbicide applied. It is also a significant extension over previous 
works which have not considered the decision about which herbicide to apply (e.g., Headley 
1968, Feder 1979, Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1986, and Pannell 1990). 
The second paper, "Endogenous Risk in Weed Control Management" develops a 
theoretical framework for intra-input substitution —modeling substitution among both types 
and quantities of herbicides applied. This allows us to understand how policies designed to 
reduce the quantities of herbicides applied affect a producer's decision about what type of 
herbicide to apply, and conversely, how policies designed to restrict the use of particular types 
of herbicides affect the quantity of herbicide a producer applies. This paper also extends self-
insurance and self-protection theory to include cases where the level of self-protection is 
uncertain, allowing us to model the effect of producer uncertainty about herbicide efficacy on 
his or her weed control decisions. Theoretical results from this extension of self-protection 
theory are shown to parallel implications derived from expected utility theory (Arrow 1984, 
ch. 9). Output from the WISH model is used to provide empirical evidence for the theoretical 
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implications. Again, the endogenous risk nature of the model is the key feature that enables 
us to model decisions involving herbicide types as well as quantities. 
The third paper, "The On-Farm Costs of Reducing Herbicide Groundwater and 
Surface Water Pollution", uses a simulation modeling approach to construct and evaluate the 
effects of policies aimed at reducing nonpoint source pollution associated with herbicide use. 
This paper represents a significant improvement over previous analyses because it includes a 
rich set of substitution possibilities. The cost associated with policy restrictions may be 
overestimated if the set of substitution possibilities is limited. Also, predictions about the 
effect of policy restrictions on nonpoint source pollution are likely to be inaccurate if the 
substitution set is limited. Previous studies such as Taylor and Frohberg 1977, Knutson et al. 
1990, Kania and Johnson 1981, Swinton 1991, Cox and Easter 1990 have used very limited 
substitution possibilities. Others have relied on survey methods and expert opinion to develop 
a somewhat larger substitution set (e.g.. Burton and Martin 1987, Smith et al. 1990). This 
paper attempts to use a physically based approach to develop a more complete substitution set 
combining expert opinion and simulation methods with weather and soil information to 
develop cost and yield estimates for 636 alternative weed control strategies. This rich 
substitution set allows us the flexibility to consider the effects of a wide range of nonpoint 
source pollution policies. A key contribution of this approach is we can show the most 
efficient economic and environmental tradeoffs that are achievable with available policy tools, 
and we can identify the specific policies used to achieve these efficient tradeoffs. This is a 
significant improvement over previous studies which either identify efficient environmental 
and economic tradeoffs achievable with current production technology but fail to identity the 
policies that can be used to achieve these tradeoffs (see, for example, Xu et al. 1995) or 
analyze only a limited and/or impractical policy set (see, for example, Johnson et al. 1991, 
Mapp et al. 1994, and Lakshminarayan et al. 1994). 
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PAPER 1. NONPOINT POLLUTION, WEEDS AND RISK 
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Nonpoint Pollution, Weeds and Risk* 
David W. Archer 
Jason F. Shogren 
May 1993 
Revised June 1993 
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research is partially funded by the US Environmental Protection Agency. Journal Paper No. 
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51. 
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ABSTRACT 
Nonpoint pollution from agricultural production continues to force regulators to 
rethink policies aimed at reducing input sources such as herbicides and fertilizers. This paper 
considers how a producer's choice of an input strategy defined by application rate or 
persistence affect input use patterns, and consequently, nonpoint pollution. Working within 
an endogenous risk framework, we explore how input sets with herbicides defined either as 
self insurance or self protection are affected by increased risk of herbicide treatment failure. 
Our results suggest that increased risk will generally decrease both herbicide and fertilizer 
application rates, resulting in the use of less flexible and less persistent herbicides. In 
addition, a quantity constraint policy restricting the amount of herbicide applied will decrease 
the amount of fertilizer applied. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture is one of the largest contributors to nonpoint source pollution in the 
United States (USEPA, 1992). Griffin (1991, p.7) cites the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) National Water Quality Inventory reporting that 50 to 70 percent 
of "impaired or threatened surface water" is affected by nonpoint agricultural pollution. A 
substantial portion of agriculture's contribution to nonpoint pollution comes from crop 
production, with repeated detection of nutrient and pesticide sources in both surface water 
and groundwater (see Shortle and Dunn, 1986; Hanley, 1991; Russell and Shogren, 1993). 
Both human and ecosystem health are perceived to be threatened, thereby increasing the 
pressure to impose more regulation on input sources such as fertilizer and herbicides. 
A common form of input source regulation is the quantity constraint, where a policy 
maker restricts or bans the use of certain inputs. The success of a quantity constraint, 
however, depends on the input substitution set faced by the producer. In agricultural 
production, this set includes both inter-input and intra-input substitution. Inter-input 
substitution captures the trade-off between the use of, say herbicides and fertilizer. 
Understanding how the producer trades off one for another given changes in his constraint 
system will reflect the degree of success of a policy. If a herbicide restriction induces more 
use of fertilizer, the policy maker has simply traded-off one source of pollution for another 
(Crocker and Shogren, 1993), Intra-input substitution implies that the producer has a set of 
input strategies all aimed at one goal, say weed control, such that he can substitute one input 
strategy for another depending on how the quantity constraint alters relative prices. In the 
case of herbicides, the producer might consider trading quantity for persistence. The choice 
of an input strategy will also have an indirect effect on the use of other production inputs. 
Therefore, capturing the environmental effects of agricultural requires policy makers to 
consider how both the quantity and type of input affect the sources of nonpoint pollution. As 
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an example, a regulation that limits the application rate of a herbicide has a direct and indirect 
effect. The direct effect is simply to reduce the amount of the herbicide applied. But even if 
the output mix is unchanged, the indirect effect acts to shift to other herbicides and change the 
amounts of fertilizers applied. These indirect effects impact both the level and intensity of 
nonpoint pollution, and consequently the effectiveness of the regulation. 
This paper explores this relationship between nonpoint pollution, weed control and 
risk. We use an endogenous risk approach to model the relationship between both the types 
and quantities of herbicides used and the quantity of fertilizer used when a producer 
maximizes expected profits. The endogenous risk approach captures a producer's view that a 
herbicide strategy can be used as either self insurance or self protection (Ehrlich and Becker, 
1972; Beach and Carlson, 1993). Self insurance and self protection are investments to 
increase a producer's wealth or the probability that a good state of nature occurs—in our case, 
the control of weeds. We examine optimal input rates and persistence of herbicide given 
increased risk of herbicide treatment failure—application or effectiveness failure—and given a 
quantity constraint policy of restricted use levels. .Application failure occurs if the producer 
fails to apply the herbicide, while effectiveness failure implies the applied herbicide fails to 
work, mainly due to weather conditions (e.g., too dry). 
Our results suggest that increased risk of a herbicide treatment failure will generally 
decrease both herbicide and fertilizer application rates, and result in the use of less flexible and 
less persistent herbicides, tending to decrease nonpoint pollution. The results also show that a 
quantity constraint policy that restricts the amount of herbicide applied will tend to decrease 
the amount of fertilizer applied. Similarly, a policy that restricts the amount of fertilizer 
applied will tend to decrease the amount of herbicide applied. Finally, the results suggest that 
a policy restricting the use of more flexible and more persistent herbicides will decrease the 
amount of fertilizer applied, while a policy restricting fertilizer applications will induce the use 
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of less flexible and persistent herbicides. Therefore, policies targeted at reducing nonpoint 
pollution from one input source can have the added impact of reducing the nonpoint pollution 
from another input source. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 identifies important herbicide characteristics 
that determine both the source of nonpoint pollution and a producer's production decisions. 
Sections 3 and 4 present the endogenous risk models of herbicides as self insurance and self 
protection. Finally, our conclusions are offered in Section 5. 
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2. HERBICIDE CELVRACTERISTICS AND NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION 
Most economics studies of weed control focus on either the optimal rate of herbicide 
application or the weed density threshold for applying a herbicide. While this is relevant data 
to link production decisions to levels of nonpoint pollution, the transport of pesticides through 
the soil also depends on other pesticide characteristics such as aqueous solubility, saturated 
vapor pressure, and persistence (see Wagenet and Hutson, 1991). Using a statistical 
metamodeling approach, Bouzaher et al. (1993) estimated that the decay rate, Henry's law 
constant, and soil sorption coefficient were significant predictors of the concentration levels of 
seventeen herbicides in surface and groundwater in the midwestern United States.' The 
question then is, are any of these other herbicide characteristics important in a producer's 
herbicide decision? We answer this question by considering the producer's decision about 
which herbicide to apply. 
A producer considers many factors in deciding which herbicide to apply, including 
target weed species, timing of application, mode of application, and herbicide persistence. Of 
these factors, herbicide persistence is directly related to nonpoint pollution. Holden and 
Graham (1992) stress that the frequency of occurrence of herbicides in groundwater are due 
to both the likelihood of their use and their persistence in the soil. For example, atrazine is 
the most detected herbicide in surface water, groundwater, and even in precipitation in the 
U.S. Corn Belt (Goolsby et al., 1991; Nations and Hallberg, 1992). Of the soil-applied 
'A metamodel summarizes the input-output relationships in a simulation model. For 
example, in the case of pesticide leaching into groundwater, metamodeling simplifies the 
complex fate and transport system using statistically validated response fijnctions. A 
metamodel reveals the key chemical and soil factors that influence herbicide concentrations in 
water, abstracting away from unnecessary detail, and thereby providing decision makers with 
timely information on alternative policy proposals. See Bouzaher et al, (1993) for fiarther 
discussion. 
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herbicides used on com, atrazine has the longest half-life; that is, the longest persistence 
(Becker et al., 1989). 
Herbicide persistence determines both a producer's flexibility to apply a herbicide and 
the probability that a herbicide application will be effective. In this way, the decision about 
which herbicide to apply determines the level of risk that a producer will face—the risk of 
weed control failure is endogenous. Granted the producer cannot alter the distribution of 
weather, but he can alter the probability and severity of a weed treatment failure through his 
selection of herbicide. Endogenous risk implies that a producer can affect the probability of 
losing yield to weeds by choosing a particular type of herbicide to apply, or that a producer 
can affect the magnitude of yield loss by choosing the amount of herbicide to apply (see 
Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Hiebert, 1983; Shogren and Crocker, 1991). 
Define self protection as the decision about which herbicide to apply in terms of 
persistence, and self insurance as the decision of how much herbicide to apply . By grouping 
herbicides into self protection and self insurance, we capture the intra-input substitution 
possibilities the producer can select. We also use the model to measure the relationship 
between herbicides as self insurance or self protection inputs and standard production inputs 
such as fertilizers. This allows us to examine the inter-input substitution trade-offs and the 
potential effect on nonpoint pollution. 
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3. HERBICIDES AS SELF INSURANCE 
Herbicides can only work if applied. In the U.S. Com Belt, weather conditions may 
prohibit a producer from applying a herbicide. For example, fields can be too wet for field 
work during the critical time when the herbicide must be applied to be effective. Recall we 
define this as 'application failure'. Once a herbicide is applied there is no guarantee it will be 
effective. Zimdahl (1980, ch. 6) describes critical periods during which herbicides must be 
effective in order to avoid significant yield losses. The time when these critical periods occur 
depends on weather conditions. If herbicide effectiveness runs out during a critical period or 
if there is a dry period after herbicide application, weeds may grow unchecked. Define this 
case as 'effectiveness failure'. For either type of failure yield losses can be substantial— 
Zimdahl (1980) cites studies of yield losses in corn near 38 percent for high weed densities. 
We model both application and effectiveness failures using a two state approach—a 
'good' state where there is no failure, and a 'bad' state where a failure occurs. Assume the 
producer perceives the good state occurs with probability, g , and the bad state occurs with 
probability, 1- g. Extending Pannell's (1990a) framework that captures the yield impacts of 
herbicide use, assume the producer has two decision variables—H is the amount of herbicide 
applied, and X is the amount of fertilizer applied. We include fertilizer to allow the producer 
the ability influence full control yields. We reduce model complexity by assuming fertilizer 
can always be applied. 
The producer's problem is to select X and H to maximize his expected profit. En, 
Max Ek =  g[P};,(.\')[l - D { W ) ]  - r X -  cH] + (l - 4Pro(^)[l - - r X  - f x H ]  
( 1 )  
where damage, D(W), can occur in both states and is represented by the hyperbolic damage 
function suggested by Cousens (1985), 
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D ( W )  =  ( o l [ \  +  c o l ^ W l  (2) 
W is weed density specified by 
W=W,e-'", (3) 
and Wq is pre-treatment weed density. Let Yo(X) be the weed-free yield with Yo'(X) > 0 and 
Yo"(X) < 0, where primes denote relevant derivatives. Let P denote crop price, r the price 
of fertilizer, and c the price of the herbicide. The first term on the right-hand-side of (1) 
represents the producer's profit if there is no failure; the second represents profit with failure. 
Let p = 1 represent the case of effectiveness failure where the producer incurs a herbicide cost 
in both states. Let p = 0 be the case of application failure where the producer incurs no 
herbicide cost. The producer incurs a fertilizer cost in both states since the fertilizer 
application occurs before a herbicide application failure is known. 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions for the producer's problem are 
E;r, = P r \ x ) [ { l  - g ) { \ -  r m , ) )  +  g ( \ -  D m ) ] - r  =  0 (4) 
and 
E;r„ =-4P>:,(.V)DWW^'(//) + c]-(1-,?)/X: = 0. (5) 
Equation (4) implies the expected marginal value of fertilizer from both the good and the bad 
states equals the unit price of fertilizer. For effectiveness failure, equation (5) implies the 
expected marginal value of herbicide is equal to the unit price of herbicide. For application 
failure, equation (5) implies that the marginal value of herbicide in the good state is equal to 
the unit price of herbicide in the good state. The second order conditions require Etixx 0' 
Etthj^ < 0, and G^EtixxE^hh ' (E'^xh)^ ^ 0, which are assumed to hold whenever the first 
order conditions are satisfied. 
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Let X andH represent the optimal levels of X and H. Consider the effect of an 
increase in the risk of a failure. We model the increase in the probability of failure as a 
decrease in the probability of the good state, g. The effects of a decrease in g on X* and H* 
are determined by 
dY* r 1 
= j^-E;T^^E;rHH + E^Hg^^xn] ^  ^ (6) 
and 
J 5|< 
^^ = [-E^HgE^.xx+E'2'xgE^xH]/<^ (7) 
The first term in bracicets on the right-hand-side of (6) represents the direct effect of a change 
in g on X*, while the second term is the indirect effect on X* through a change in H*. 
Similarly, the first term in (7) is the direct effect of a change in g on H , and the second term 
is the indirect effect. 
The sign of Etcreveals whether the inputs are stochastic substitutes or stochastic 
complements. If G is the Hessian matrix of the problem and Gjj are the minors of G, Hiebert 
(1983) defines inputs i and j as stochastic substitutes (complements) if Gy < 0 (> 0). We 
interpret stochastic substitutes to describe inputs where an increase in the optimal level of one 
input indirectly decreases the optimal level of the other input. Similarly, stochastic 
complements describes inputs where an increase in the optimal level of one input indirectly 
increases the optimal level of the other input. 
Since damage due to weeds is higher without herbicide than with, then 
-  P Y A X ) [ D i W , )  -  D { W ) \  >  0. (8) 
Using equation (5) we know 
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E^Th, = -PKo {X)D'{W)W'{H) - (1 - p ) c .  (9) 
If p = 0, ETiHg = 0; or if p = 1, ETrj^g > 0, Finally, assuming D'(W) > 0 and W < 0, 
E^.xn = -gPY',(X)D'mW'{H) >0. (10) 
which implies that X and H are stochastic complements. Conditions (8) - (10) suggest that 
c'X*/cg > 0 and cH*/cg > 0, which is summarized by the following proposition. 
Proposition I: An increase in the probability of effectiveness or application failure decreases 
the optimal application rates of both fertilizer and herbicide. 
Note that an increase in the probability of application failure has no direct effect on the 
optimal level of herbicide—the effect derives from the stochastic complementary between 
fertilizer and herbicide. The only way application risk affects the optimal herbicide rate is by 
shifting the optimal fertilizer rate. This suggests that for some types of risk, changes in 
herbicide use depend only on changes in the use of fertilizer. This emphasizes the imponance 
of understanding that there are two effects of risk on optimal herbicide or fertilizer levels—a 
direct effect and an indirect effect. Even if risk does not have a direct effect on herbicide use, 
risk may produce changes in herbicide use indirectly through changes in optimal fertilizer 
rates. 
A simple example illustrates. Suppose that a technological advance, such as a 
guidance system that allows herbicides to be applied more rapidly, decreases a producer's 
application risk. A policy maker who does not take into account the joint decision of fertilizer 
and herbicide rates will expect the technology to have no effect herbicide application rates 
since the direct effect of application risk on optimal herbicide rate is zero. However, in 
reality, the technology will increase optimal herbicide application rates indirectly through an 
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increase in the optimal fertilizer application rate. By not taking into account the positive 
indirect effect of risk on herbicides use, the policy maker will underestimate the effect of the 
new technology on nonpoint source pollution from herbicides. The amount underestimated 
depends on the size of the indirect effect, indicating the importance of obtaining measures of 
substitution among inputs. 
Whether the inputs are stochastic complements or stochastic substitutes also indicates 
the effect of a quantity constraint policy that restricts one input on the optimal level of the 
other input. Let there be a binding quantity constraint placed on the optimal herbicide 
application rate, H*= H. As an example from the U.S., herbicides legally must be applied at 
rates below maximum label rates. Recently, the maximum label rates for atrazine have been 
reduced form 3 pounds active ingredient applied per acre in a single year to 2.5 pounds active 
ingredient (Swoboda, 1993). The effect of the constraint policy on the optimal fertilizer 
application rate is 
cH 
( 1 1 )  
Using equation (10), this implies cX /cH > 0. A policy restricting the herbicide application 
rate decreases the optimal fertilizer application rate. Similarly, the effect of a binding 
constraint placed on the optimal fertilizer application rate is 
( P )  
cX E;r„„' 
Again using (10). this implies cH /cX>0 — a policy restricting the fertilizer application rate 
decreases the optimal herbicide application rates. 
Summarizing the case of herbicides as self insurance, an increase in either application 
risk or effectiveness risk decreases both the optimal herbicide rate and the optimal fertilizer 
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rate. If this model holds, we expect to see lower herbicide application rates and fertilizer 
application rates used in areas of higher application and effectiveness risk. From a policy 
standpoint this implies that policies which shift production to farms with lower application or 
effectiveness risk will result in fertilizers and herbicides being applied at higher rates. It also 
implies that technologies which tend to decrease application or effectiveness risk will tend to 
increase fertilizer and herbicide application rates. In both cases we would expect to see an 
increase in the potential for nonpoint source pollution. Our results also indicate that a policy 
to reduce one source of nonpoint pollution may have the added effect of reducing another 
source of nonpoint pollution. A policy that restricts herbicide application rates can reduce 
fertilizer application rates, or vise versa. 
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4. HERBICIDES AS SELF PROTECTION 
The preceding discussion considered the producer's weed control decision involving 
only the amount of herbicide to apply—self insurance. Now consider the producer's choice 
of which herbicide to apply—self protection. For application failure, the level of self-
protection depends on herbicide characteristics that increase the probability of a successful 
application. If one herbicide can be applied over a longer time period than another then it will 
have a higher probability of being successfiilly applied. Bouzaher et al. (1992) quantify this 
time period for over 300 weed control strategies for corn, calling it the 'application window'. 
Similarly, for effectiveness failure, a herbicide that is effective over a longer period of time will 
have a higher probability of controlling weeds. Bouzaher et al. quantify this period as the 
'effectiveness window'. An example illustrates. The critical period for pre-emergence 
application of Bladex to achieve full control in Iowa was estimated to be May 10 to May 25— 
the length of the application window is 16 days. Bladex was also estimated to remain 
effective on broadleaf weeds for a period of 40 days after application and effective on grasses 
for 50 days. Without loss of generality, we simplify the analysis by focusing on only one 
application window. 
Let q denote the length of the relevant window. Assume that for the available 
herbicides, self protection, q, is a continuous variable.^ The length of the effectiveness 
window determines the probability a herbicide is effective once applied, while the length of the 
application window determines the probability a farmer is able to apply the herbicide. The 
probability of the good state, g, is redefined as g(q), with g'(q) > 0. The unit cost of the 
herbicide will also depend on q, such that c is redefined as c(q). Presumably herbicides that 
provide longer effectiveness or application windows are more expensive, implying c'(q) > 0. 
-Choosing a herbicide is a discrete choice implying the choice of window length is also 
discrete. To maintain mathematical tractability, we assume the discrete nature of the problem 
can be approximated by a continuous variable. 
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If this were not the case, we would expect a comer solution with q either at zero or at a 
technological maximum. 
Consider the weed control strategies defined by Bouzaher et al. (1992). Figures 1 and 
2 show the application and effectiveness window lengths and the cost of each strategy applied 
on reduced tillage and a clay soil. In each figure, the solid line joins strategies which provide 
the longest combined window lengths for a given cost and is indicative of the cost function a 
producer faces. As window lengths increase, costs also increase at an increasing rate. Figures 
1 and 2 also illustrate the effect of banning the use of various herbicides. The dashed line 
joins strategies that provide the longest combined window lengths for a given cost, after 
eliminating the strategies containing atrazine. Banning atrazine shifts the cost curve upward 
and to the left, so producers must pay a higher price to purchase herbicides with equal 
window lengths. Also, herbicides with the longest window lengths are eliminated. Similarly, 
the dotted line joins strategies that provide the longest combined window lengths for a given 
cost eliminating all strategies that contain triazines. Banning triazines flirther shifts the cost 
curve upward and to the left, again increasing the price a producer pays for a given window 
length and restricting the choices to smaller window lengths. 
Assume the farmer takes herbicide application rates as fixed—the farmer applies a 
herbicide only at the recommended rate. In the self protection model, the producer chooses 
the optimal effectiveness or application window and the optimal fertilizer rate. The profit 
maximizing producer's problem is now 
Max E;r = g(q)[PY,(^)[l - D{W)] - rX-  ciq)H] 
+(l-^,^(r/))[P}^,(.Y)[l-Z)(P^;j]-/vr-/x:(7)//]. 
This problem corresponds to the self protection problem used by Hiebert, with q 
representing the self protection good. The key difference is that for application uncertainty 
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Figure 1. Efficient application windows 
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(i.e., p = 0) the cost of self protection appears only in the good state. The first order 
conditions for the problem are 
E/r,, = P>:,V)[(l-g'(9))(l-D(Ffo)) + g(^7)(l-D(Pn)]-'- = 0 (14) 
and 
E;r^ - g'{q)PY,{X)[D{W,)-D{W)\ 
- (1 - p)H{g' iq)c(q)  -  giq)c ' iq)}  -  fx '{q)H = 0. 
As in the self insurance case, (14) implies the expected marginal value of fertilizer over both 
the good and bad states is equal to the unit price of fertilizer. For effectiveness risk, equation 
(15) requires that the marginal benefit of q in shifting the probability toward the good state is 
equal to the marginal cost of q. For application risk, the net marginal benefit of q is equal to 
the expected marginal cost of q. The second order conditions require Etcxx 0. E;rqq< 0, 
and JsEjixx^^qq - (EJtxq)" ^ 
Now consider how self protection is affected by an increase in the risk of failure. 
Following Hiebert, suppose g(q) has the form g(q) = a + Ph(q), with h'(q) > 0 and (3 > 0. 
Increased risk occurs by decreasing either a or [B. A decrease in a represents a constant 
increase in the probability of a failure for all lengths of the eflFectiveness or application 
window, q. Think of decreasing a as increasing the probability of failure independent of the 
length of the application window. A decrease in p represents an increase in the probability of 
a failure (increasing along q) through a decrease in the productivity of q. A decrease in P is 
described by site specific eflFectiveness or application technology. If two identical producers 
apply herbicides on two different soil types, but the herbicide breaks down more slowly on the 
first farmer's soil than on the second, the effectiveness window is more productive for the first 
farmer. Alternatively, if two producers apply herbicides to equal areas of land and one 
producer applies more rapidly that the other, the producer who takes more time has a lower 
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application window productivity. Climate is another way to think of a decrease in p. 
Comparing a farm in the southern Com Beit to one in the north, if the southern farm tends to 
have more days suitable for field work than the northern farm, the northern farm must make 
less use of a given application window. Fewer days suitable for field work corresponds to a 
lower p. 
The effects of a decrease in a on X* and q* are determined by 
Assuming second order conditions hold implies Ettxx 0. ErCqq < 0, and J > 0. Given 
damage is higher without herbicide than with, we know 
(16) 
and 
(17) 
= 1%{X)[D{W„)-D{W)]>0,  ( 1 8 )  
and given g'(q) > 0 
E^x = -g '{q)PYAX)[D{W,)  -  Dm] > 0. (19) 
Given c'(q) > 0, then we know 
(20) 
If p = 1, Ertqct = 0; or if p = 0, ErCqoi < 0. Equation (18) implies the direct effect of a 
decrease in a on X* decreases the optimal level of fertilizer use. By definition, equation (19) 
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implies q and X are stochastic complements. For effectiveness risk, equation (20) implies 
there is no direct effect of a decrease in a on q*. For application risk, equation (20) implies 
3|C 
the direct effect of a decrease in a on q increases the length of the optimal application 
window. If p = 1, we have cX*/oa > 0 and dq*/da > 0. 
Proposition 2: Holding herbicide application rate and the effectiveness of self protection 
constant, an increase in the probability of effectiveness failure decreases both the optimal 
fertilizer rate and the optimal length of the effectiveness window. 
It is likely that herbicides with shorter effectiveness windows tend to decay more 
rapidly in the environment. This indicates that an increase in effectiveness risk that leaves the 
productivity of the effectiveness window unchanged may reduce potential negative 
environmental impacts of agricultural chemicals both by reducing the amount of fertilizer 
applied and by reducing the persistence of herbicides that are used. It is important to note, 
however, that herbicide application rates are held constant. Reconsidering Figures 1 and 2, 
we note that as window lengths increase we move out of the strictly non-triazine activities, 
and as window lengths continue to increase we move into activities which all contain atrazine. 
For application risk, given the signs of the direct effects, knowing that q and X are 
stochastic complements shows that the direct and indirect effects of increased risk work in 
opposite directions for both X and q . This implies that the signs of cX /ca and cq /ca are 
ambiguous. In contrast to self insurance, herbicide use as self protection does not necessarily 
imply that increased risk decreases optimal input levels. The ambiguity emanates from a 
decrease in the expected marginal herbicide cost due to an increase in the probability that the 
herbicide cannot be applied. This increases the optimal length of the application window. 
Since the length of the application window and the fertilizer rate are stochastic complements, 
this increases the optimal fertilizer rate. However, the marginal value of fertilizer is reduced 
by an increase in the probability of failure which decreases the optimal fertilizer rate. Since 
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the length of the application window and the fertilizer rate are stochastic complements, this 
also decreases the optimal fertilizer rate. If the decrease in expected marginal cost of q is 
offset by the decrease of expected marginal revenues due to the increased probability of 
failure, then self protection would increase. Note that for effectiveness risk, there is no 
decrease in expected herbicide cost due to increased risk, thereby eliminating any ambiguity. 
The effects of a decrease in the productivity of self protection, p, on X* and q* are 
determined by 
Given the second order conditions hold and equation (19), E7ix.\< 0, E7tqq< 0, J > 0, and 
0. Again since damage without herbicide is greater than damage with herbicide 
(21) 
and 
(22) 
= h{q)PY,  {X)[D{W,)  -  D{W)\  > 0. (23) 
Using the first order condition (15), Ejtq = 0 
= {{ \ -  p)ac '{q)H)l  P  + p(h\q)PY,{X)[D{W,)  - D(^f)]) > 0. (24) 
The signs of (23) and (24) allow us to determine that cX*/c|3 > 0 and cq*/5P > 0, which is 
summarized below. 
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Proposition 3; Holding herbicide application rates constant, an increase in the risk of 
effectiveness or application failure through a reduction in the productivity of self protection 
decreases both the optimal fertilizer application rate and the optimal length of the effectiveness 
or application window. 
For effectiveness risk, this is the same result as a shift in g(q) leaving the productivity 
of q unchanged. Assuming herbicide application rates are held constant, increased risk 
through a decrease in the productivity of the effectiveness window will have positive 
environmental impacts since fertilizers are used at lower rates and the herbicides used will 
tend to decay more rapidly. For application risk. Proposition 3 differs from the shift in g(q) 
because the direct effects of decreasing a versus decreasing P have opposite effect on q . 
The direct effect of decreasing a increases the optimal application window, while the direct 
effect of decreasing p decreases the optimal application window. This difference occurs 
because a decrease in a decreases the expected marginal cost of q but leaves the marginal 
benefit of q unchanged, implying it is more attractive to apply a herbicide with a longer 
application window. However, for a decrease in P, in order for the first order conditions to 
hold, the marginal benefit of q decreases more rapidly than the expected marginal cost 
implying it is less attractive to apply a herbicide with a longer application window. 
Again consider Figures 1 and 2. An increase in risk through a decrease in the 
productivity of the application window results in a shift from non-triazine activities to 
activities containing triazines. If we think of herbicides with longer application windows as 
being more potent, a shift toward longer application windows may be associated with more 
damaging sources of nonpoint source pollution. In this case an increase in risk through a 
decrease in the productivity of the application window decreases the potential damage 
associated with nonpoint source pollution. However, if the productivity of self protection, q, 
endures given increased risk, this might not hold. Understanding the source of application risk 
is usefijl in determining its impact on the environment. 
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Looking at equation (19) we note that q and X are stochastic complements. Similar to 
the self insurance problem, this implies that a policy that restricts the use of herbicides with 
longer effectiveness or application windows will decreases fertilizer application rates. In 
addition, a policy that restricts fertilizer application rates will tend to decrease the use of more 
flexible herbicides. 
Summarizing the herbicide as self protection case, an increase in effectiveness risk 
decreases both the optimal fertilizer rate and the length of the optimal application window. If 
this model holds, we expect to see lower fertilizer application rates and less persistent 
herbicides being used in areas of higher effectiveness risk. From a policy standpoint, this 
implies that policies which shift production to farms with higher effectiveness risk will increase 
fertilizer application rates and lead to use of more persistent herbicides. For an increase in 
application risk, the result is not so clear. An increase in application rates through a decrease 
in the productivity of the application window decreases both the optimal fertilizer rate and the 
length of the optimal application window. In this case we expect to see lower fertilizer 
application rates and less potent herbicides used in areas of higher application risk. If the 
increase in application risk leaves the productivity of the application window unchanged, 
however, the effect on the optimal fertilizer rate and the length of the optimal application 
window is ambiguous. Our results also show that a policy designed to restrict fertilizer 
application rates can lead to use of less flexible, and presumably less persistent herbicides. 
Similarly, a policy designed to restrict the use of more flexible herbicides will reduce fertilizer 
application rates. Consequently, policies that have the direct effect of reducing one source of 
nonpoint pollution may have a positive indirect effect of reducing another. 
31 
5. CONCLUSION 
We use an endogenous risk model to explore the effects of weed treatment risk and 
nonpoint pollution policy on the types of herbicides used as well as their quantities. This 
framework also allows us to understand inter-input substitutions between herbicides and 
fertilizers. In most cases, our results indicate that risk tends to decrease the quantities of 
herbicides and fertilizers used and leads to use of less persistent herbicides. This would 
indicate risk of weed control failure has an unambiguous effect on nonpoint pollution from 
these sources. Consequently as risk reducing technologies become available we should expect 
nonpoint pollution problems to increase. 
Our results suggest that herbicide quantities and fertilizer quantities are stochastic 
complements, so policies that restrict one of these quantities may have the indirect effect of 
decreasing the other. This would increase the effectiveness of a policy aimed at decreasing 
nonpoint pollution. Similarly, our results indicate that herbicide persistence and fertilizer 
quantities are stochastic complements, implying that policies that restrict one of these will 
have the indirect etYect of decreasing the other. Again this would increase the effectiveness of 
nonpoint pollution policy. 
32 
REFERENCES 
Beach E., and G. Carlson. A Hedonic Analysis of Herbicides: Does User Safety and Water 
Quality Matter? Amer. J. Ag. Econ (forthcoming 1993). 
Becker, R.L., D. Hergfeld, K.R. Ostlie, and E.J. Stamm-Katovich. "Pesticides: Surface 
Runoff, Leaching, and Exposure Concerns." University of Minnesota 
Extension Service, publication AG-BU-3911, 1989, p. 32. 
Bouzaher, A., D. Archer, R. Cabe, A. Carriquiry, and J.F. Shogren. "Effects of Environmental 
Policy on Trade-offs in Agri-chemical Management." J. Env. Man. 36 (1992):69-80. 
Bouzaher, A., R. Cabe, A. Carriquiry, P. Gassman, P. Lakshminarayan, and J.F. Shogren. 
"Metamodels and Nonpoint Pollution Policy in Agriculture." Water Resources Res. 
29 (1993): 1579-1587. 
Cousens, R. "A Simple Model Relating Yield Loss to Weed Density." Ann. Appl. Biol.. 
107(1985):239-252. 
Crocker, T. and J. Shogren. "Transferable Risk and the Technology of Environmental 
Conflict." Sac. Nat. Re.s. (forthcoming 1993). 
Ehrlich, I. and G.S. Becker. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection." J. Pol. 
Econ. 80(1972):623-648, 
Goolsby, D.A., R.C. Coupe, and D.J. Markovchick. Distribution of Selected 
Herbicides and Nitrate in the Mississippi River and its Major Tributaries, 
April Through .June 1991. U.S. Geological Survey, Water-Resources 
Investigations Report 91-4163, Denver, Colorado 1991. 
Griffm, R. Jr. "Introducing NPS Water Pollution." EPA J. 17 (1991): 6-9. 
Hanley, N, ed. Farming and the Countryside. An Economic Analysis of External 
Costs and Benefits. Wallingford, UK: CAB International, 1991. 
Hiebert, L.D. "Self Insurance, Self Protection and the Theory of the Competitive Firm." S. 
Econ.50(1983):160-68. 
Holden, L.R. and J. A. Graham. "Results of the National Alachlor Well Water Survey." 
Environ. Sci. Tech. 26(1992):935-943. 
Nations, B.K. and G.R. Hallberg. "Pesticides in Iowa Precipitation." J. Env. Oual. 21 
(July-September, 1992):486-492. 
33 
Pannell, D.J. "Responses to Risk in Weed Control Decisions Under Expected Profit 
Maximisation." J. Ag. Econ. 41(1990a):391-403. 
Pannell, D.J. "Do Herbicides Reduce Income Variability From Agronomic Crops?" 
Proceedings of the 9th Australian Weeds Conference, Adelaide, South Australia, 
August 6-10, 1990b. 
Russell, C. and J. Shogren, eds. Theory, Modelling and Experience in the Management of 
Nonpoint-Sonrce Pollution.. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. 
Shogren, J. and T. Crocker. Risk, Self-Protection, and Ex Ante Economic Value. J. Env. 
Econ. Mgmt. 20(1991): 1-15. 
Shortle, J. and J. Dunn. The Relative Efficiency of Agricultural Source Water Pollution 
Control Policies. Amer. J. Ag. Econ. 68 (1986): 668-677. 
Swoboda, R. New Rules for Atrazine. Wall. Farm. (April 1993): 10-11. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Managing Nonpoint Source 
Pollution: Final Report to Congress on Section 319 of the Clean Water Act 
(1989)." EPA-506/9-90, U.S. EPA, Washington, D.C. (1992). 
Wagenet, R.J. and J.L. Hutson. "Modeling Pesticide Transport and Transformation in the 
Soil-Plant System." Pesticide Chemistry, Helmet Freshe (ed ), New York: VCH 
Publishers Inc., 1991, pp. 347-357. 
Zimdahl, R.L. Weed-Crop Competition: A Review. Corvallis, OR: International Plant 
Protection Center, 1980. 
34 
PAPER 2. ENDOGENOUS RISK IN WEED CONTROL MANAGEMENT 
35 
Endogenous Risk in Weed Control Management" 
David W. Archer 
Jason F. Shogren** 
November 1994 
revised November 1995 
*Bruce Babcock, Aziz Bouzaher, Todd Sandler and two reviewers supplied useflil 
comments, as did seminar participants at the Agricultural Economics Society, Oxford, 
Appalachian State and Wyoming. This research is partially funded by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency. All errors remain our own. 
Journal Paper No, J-15509, Iowa State University Agricultural and Home Economics 
Experiment Station, Ames, lA. Project Number 2872. 
36 
ABSTRACT 
Weed control decisions are modeled in an endogenous risk framework where a 
producer invests in self-insurance and self-protection to reduce the severity of a realized pest 
infestation, or reduce the likelihood the infestation occurs. Self-insurance and self-protection 
are risk reducing technologies that capture both the type and quantity of herbicides used. 
We supply conditions to unambiguously sign the effects of an increase in the probability of 
application or effectiveness failure and increased application or effectiveness uncertainty on 
optimal herbicide choices. If self-protection and self-insurance are stochastic substitutes, 
nonpoint source pollution policies targeted to reduce herbicide loadings can increase the use 
of more persistent herbicides. Policies seeming to decrease pollution by reducing total mass 
may induce a substitution to herbicides more damaging or more likely to be transported to 
sensitive areas. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economists have argued that pesticides act as market insurance against uncertain crop 
damage. Uncertainty induces a risk averse producer to use more pesticides than he would 
otherwise use to transfer wealth from good to bad states of nature [see for example Norgaard 
(1976) and Feder (1979)]. But Pannell (1990, 1991) has questioned this view. Using a 
damage function supported by agronomic evidence on weed control, Pannell demonstrated 
that uncertainty might decrease herbicide use for a risk averse producer. Pannell points out 
that uncertainty about variables such as output price and yields may indeed lead to lower 
optimal levels of pesticide use. However, using a damage function supported by agronomic 
evidence on weed control, uncertainty about variables such as pest density and pest mortality 
lead to higher optimal levels of pesticide use. This suggests that other reasons beyond market 
insurance may exist to explain pesticide use under uncertainty—an argument supported by 
Deen et al. (1993) who show that only extremely risk averse producers increase herbicide use 
under uncertainty. 
This paper offers another perspective for pesticide use under uncertainty—endogenous 
risk. At the most fundamental level, endogenous risk redefines the standard view of pesticide 
use that generally presumes that the likelihood of weed damage is beyond the control of a 
producer. Endogenous risk implies that a producer can invest resources in risk reducing 
technologies that influence the expected economic consequences of the hazards he or she 
confronts. This realization has profound impacts on formal evaluation of weed control 
strategies and the subsequent environmental impacts which have been traditionally driven by 
an assumption of exogenous risk. Indeed, outside the field of economics, discussions of risk 
typically consider actions that modify events or reduce the vulnerability to loss [Kates (1978)]. 
Note that we follow this substantial literature on environmental damages, and define "risk" as 
the probability times the severity of damages, not as the variability of expected wealth [see for 
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example Burton et al. (1987)]. The main purpose of the endogenous risk approach is to break 
the mind-set that equates the probability distribution of outcomes with the probability 
distribution of states. Both outcomes and the lotteries that define these outcomes depend on a 
producer's actions. 
Two decades ago Ehriich and Becker defined the two basic technologies of 
endogenous risk—self-protection and self-insurance. Self-protection reduces the probability 
of an undesired state of the world, while self-insurance reduces the severity if the state occurs. 
Since their seminal article, researchers have explored how choice under risk is affected by the 
opportunity to reduce risk using self-protection and self-insurance. Examples include Hiebert 
(1983), Boyer and Dionne (1983), Chang and Ehriich (1985), Shogren and Crocker (1991), 
among others. One general conclusion is that the endogenous risk model allows for a broader 
range of behavior than does the standard exogenous risk model. This broader, less 
constrained range of behavior exists because models with endogenous risk assume preferences 
over both outcomes and the lotteries that define these outcomes [Shogren (1991)], As a 
consequence, endogenous risk captures the precise factor of interest in weed control strategies 
—the technology of risk reduction. 
Our approach adapts the concepts of self-protection and self-insurance to weed 
control decisions. From an endogenous risk perspective, weed control is viewed as a risk 
reduction technology aimed at decreasing the expected damage from pest infestation. 
Whereas previous studies have focused primarily on herbicide application rates and have not 
addressed the complexity in producers' choices of crop protection technologies,' the 
endogenous risk approach provides a theoretical setting to capture some of this complexity. 
Some of the weed control factors that might be considered in the endogenous risk setting 
' See for example Osteen and Kuchler (1986), Burton and Martin (1987), Taylor et al. (1991), 
and Richardson et al. (1991). 
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include herbicide types and quantities, application timings, cultivation methods and timings, 
and crop rotations.^ In this analysis we focus on three of these factors: herbicide application 
rate, herbicide timing flexibility, and herbicide persistence. Modeling herbicide application 
rates as investments in self-insurance which decreases the magnitude of yield loss, and 
modeling herbicide timing flexibility or herbicide persistence as investments in self-protection 
which reduces the probability of a loss we capture both the type and quantity of herbicide 
used. This allows us to consider the substitution between rate and persistence and between 
rate and timing flexibility, and it allows us to consider how this substitution is affected by 
increased uncertainty regarding the efficacy of alternative weed control strategies. We supply 
conditions to unambiguously sign the effects of increased application or effectiveness risk on 
these optimal herbicide choices. Since a producer can replace a herbicide with a high 
application rate but low persistence for another with a low rate and high persistence, modeling 
these substitution possibilities is vital for a better understanding of producer decisions and 
more effective nonpoint source pollution policy. 
Hirshleifer (1970) and other economists have argued it is always possible to redefine a 
problem such that the state of nature is independent of a producer's actions. This position 
allows one, as Laffont (1980) noted, to continue working within the highly tractable 
framework of exogenous risk. But as Ehrlich and Becker point out, "a search for state 
probabilities that are independent of human action would be self-defeating" (p.638). Consider 
a situation in which weed infestation threatens a producer's crop. The probability and severity 
of weed damage can be altered if the producer selects an appropriate weed control strategy. 
.\n analyst might redefine the situation as independent of the producer's actions by focusing 
solely on the likelihood of weed infestation, over which the producer likely has no control. 
But this definition is economically irrelevant if the question is the producer's response to and 
^ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point. 
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damages from weed infestation. The producer is concerned about the probability of weed 
damage and the severity of any realized damage, and in his or her ability to exercise some 
control over those events. The producer's risk is endogenous because by expending his or her 
valuable resources he or she can influence the probability that good states of nature occur, and 
reduce the severity of the bad state if it does occur. 
Introduction of endogenous risk causes several key interdependences to come to the 
forefront. Our results suggest that although increased probability of loss can reduce herbicide 
application rates, this is likely to be offset by a shift toward the use of more persistent 
herbicides. For a given set of plausible conditions, this result can hold even if the probability 
of loss is uncertain. While this supports Panneii's argument, the result also suggests the use of 
more potent herbicides. If self-protection and self-insurance are stochastic substitutes, 
nonpoint source pollution policies targeted to reduce herbicide loadings can increase the use 
of more persistent herbicides. Policies appearing to decrease pollution by reducing total mass 
may induce a substitution to herbicides more damaging or more likely to be transported to 
sensitive areas. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model of self-protection and self-
insurance given the probability of a good state is known with certainty. Section 3 relaxes the 
assumption of certain probabilities and explores the restrictions under which one can 
unambiguously sign the comparative statics of increased uncertainty regarding weed control 
efficacy. We employ the WISH simulation model to test the plausibility of these alternative 
restrictions. Finally, we offer our conclusions in Section 4. 
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2. SELF-INSURANCE AND SELF-PROTECTION WITH CERTAIN 
PROBABILITIES 
In the US Com Belt, weather uncertainty can lead to two catastrophic failures in weed 
control: application failure and effectiveness failure. Application failure occurs when 
weather conditions prevent the producer from applying a herbicide, for example, fields are too 
wet during the critical application times. Effectiveness failure occurs when weather 
conditions render an applied herbicide completely ineffective. This occurs if no rain falls after 
application when rain is needed to carry the herbicide into the soil, or if herbicide effectiveness 
runs out during a "critical period for weed control.""' In both cases, weeds will grow 
unchecked causing a substantial loss in yield, Zimdahl (1980) cites studies of yield losses in 
corn for various weed species at different weed densities, indicating yield losses of 25-38% for 
high weed densities, 
Following Archer and Shogren (1994), consider a risk neutral farmer who employs 
herbicides as self-protection and self-insurance on a per-acre basis to reduce the probability of 
application and effectiveness failures, thereby increasing his expected returns from crop 
production.'^ Let q and H represent self-protection and self-insurance efforts. Assume there 
are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive states of the world—a good state implying 
no weed control failure and a bad state implying failure. The probability that the good state 
occurs, g(q), is a function of self-protection, q, where g'(q) > 0. Primes denote relevant 
derivatives. The bad state occurs with probability [1- g(q)]. 
Self-protection, q, is the herbicide type based on timing of application or herbicide 
persistence. The type depends on whether the producer is trying to reduce application or 
'See Zimdahl (1980, chapter 6) for a discussion of the "critical period." 
' The assumption of risk neutrality in weed control has some empirical support (see Pannell, 
1991, for a more complete discussion). We assume risk neutrality to simplify the exposition 
and focus on technological effects rather than tastes. 
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effectiveness failure. For application failure, self-protection is the timing flexibility of a 
herbicide. Timing flexibility is quantified as the length of time during which a herbicide can be 
applied and still be effective. Following Bouzaher et al. (1992), call this time period the 
"application window". For example, atrazine combined with cyanazine is a common tank mix 
used to control weeds in com. The period from May 10 to May 25 represents the critical 
period for a preemergence application of this tank mix in Iowa to achieve full control of 
weeds. In contrast, metolachlor and dicamba is also a preemergence tank mix, but the critical 
period is reduced to May 10 to May 17. The application window for atrazine-cyanazine is 16 
days, while the window for metolachlor and dicamba is 8 days. The atrazine-cyanazine tank 
mix represents a more flexible weed control strategy. 
For effectiveness failure, self-protection is the temporal persistence of a herbicide once 
applied—the "'effectiveness window". For corn herbicides, Bouzaher et al. (1992) defined 
effectiveness windows for two broad categories of weeds: broadleafs and grasses. The 
preemergence atrazine-cyanazine tank mix was judged to remain effective on broadleafs for 70 
days after application, and on grasses for 50 days. Metolachlor and dicamba were judged to 
remain effective on broadleafs for 20 days after application, and on grasses for 50 days. For 
simplicity, we focus on only one effectiveness window. We can think of this assumption as 
modeling a producer who is faced with an infestation of only one category of weeds (e.g., 
grasses only). 
Therefore, let q denote the length of the relevant window, where q is continuous." 
The application window alters the probability that a farmer can apply the herbicide, while the 
effectiveness window influences the probability that a herbicide is effective once applied. For 
^In reality, choosing a herbicide is a discrete choice so the choice of window length is also 
discrete. To keep this model mathematically tractable, we assume that the discrete nature of 
the problem is not critical and the choices can be approximated by a continuous variable. This 
is similar to the assumption made by Beach and Carlson (1993). 
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simplicity, we consider the choice of either an application window or an effectiveness window 
only as separate cases. In reality, this may be a joint decision. Also, in reality, producers have 
the option of post emergence herbicides to control weed escapes from previous treatments. 
While these possibilities are simulated in the WISH model (Weather Impact Simulator for 
Herbicides) developed by Bouzaher et al. (1992), they add considerable complication to the 
theoretical analysis. The unit cost, c(q), of the herbicide also depends on q. Assume that 
herbicides providing longer effectiveness or application windows are more expensive, c'(q) > 
0.^ 
Figure 1 shows a plot of the sum of application and effectiveness window lengths 
versus the cost of each strategy applied on reduced tillage and a clay soil. Each point on the 
plot was generated using the WISH model. The solid line joins strategies that provide the 
longest combined window lengths for a given cost, indicative of the producer's cost fijnction.^ 
As window lengths increase, costs increase at an increasing rate. Figure 1 also illustrates the 
effect of banning the use of various herbicides. The dashed line joins the most cost effective 
strategies that do not contain atrazine. Banning atrazine shifts the cost curve upward to the 
left; producers pay a higher price to purchase herbicides with equal window lengths. Also, 
herbicides with the longest window lengths are eliminated. Similarly, the dotted line joins 
strategies that do not contain triazines. A triazine ban further shifts the cost curve upward to 
the left, increasing the price a producer pays for a given window length and restricting the 
choices to smaller window lengths. 
Self-insurance, H, is the application rate of the herbicide. Note there is a difference 
^If this were not the case, then we would expect a corner solution with q either at zero or at a 
technological maximum. 
The solid line is used to highlight these strategies. We are not implying that a convex 
combination of these strategies is a feasible weed control option. 
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reduced tillage and a clay soil 
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between herbicide self-insurance and the typical notion of self-insurance. In other discussions 
of endogenous risk, self-insurance typically decreases the magnitude of loss if a failure occurs. 
This brings the wealth in the two states closer together by increasing the returns in the bad 
state, thereby decreasing income variability. But in the herbicide model, yield losses occur in 
both the good and bad state—herbicide use only decreases the magnitude of losses when 
applied, corresponding to the good state in our model. Herbicide use drives the states further 
apart by increasing returns in the good state, thereby increasing income variability. The 
damage in the good state caused by weed control failure, D(W), is a function of weed density, 
W, which is influenced by the level of self-insurance, H, such that D'(W)W'(H) < 0. This 
specification agrees with Pannell's (1990b) observation that increased herbicide use can 
increase income variability, and that herbicides are not risk reducing inputs in the traditional 
economics sense. 
The producer maximizes per-acre expected profits by selecting q and H 
Max E;r  =  giq)[ l%[\  -  OmH))]  -  ciq)H] + ( l  -  g(c/ ) ) [P}: . [ l  -  D{W,)]  -  fx{q)H\  (1 )  
where Yq is weed-free yield and P is crop price. The parameter p is a binary zero-one 
variable. Let p = 1 for an effectiveness failure since the producer incurs a herbicide cost, 
c(q)H, in both states. Let p = 0 for an application failure since the producer incurs no 
herbicide cost in the bad state. Let the damage, D(W), be specified as a hyperbolic fiinction 
[Cousens (1985) and Pannell (1990)] 
D{W{H))  = (ol[ \  + o) l{ '^W{H)) l  (2) 
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with weed density, W(H), specified by 
PF(N) = fF,e-'^, (3) 
where Wq is pretreatment weed density, co is asymptotic yield loss, <I> is per unit yield loss, 
and k is a parameter. The first term in (1) represents the producer's profit if there is no weed 
control failure, the second term represents profits with either an application or an effectiveness 
failure. 
The first order conditions for an interior maximum are 
EKJ = g 'mPY,{D(W,) - D{W)] - (1 - p)c{q)H) - c'(q)H{p + (1 - p)g{q)} = 0 (4) 
and 
= -gU{)PKD'(W)W'iH)  -  {(1 - p)g{q)c{q)  -f pc{q)}  = 0. (5) 
The second order conditions require ETrHjj[<0, E7rqq<0, and GsE7r[4HE7iqq-(E7rHq)->0. 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (4) represents the marginal expected 
benefit of self-protection, q, in increasing the probability of successfijl weed control. For the 
application case, the benefits of reduced damage with a successfijl herbicide treatment are 
partially offset by the added cost of a successfiil herbicide application. For the effectiveness 
case, this offset does not occur since the herbicide is applied in both states. The second term 
in equation (4) represents the marginal cost of q for the effectiveness case, and it represents 
the expected marginal cost of q for the application case. 
In equation (5), the first term represents the expected marginal benefit of self-
insurance, H, in reducing crop damage. The second term represents the unit price of herbicide 
for the effectiveness case and the expected unit price of herbicide for the application case. For 
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the application case we can think of the herbicide application rate being decided as it is 
applied. In this case, the producer chooses H so the marginal benefit of H in the good state is 
equal to the marginal cost of H in the good state. 
Following Hiebert (1983), let g(q) take the form g(q) = g° + Yh(q), with h'(q) > 0 and 
with gO and y as positive constants. An increase in the probability of a loss is modeled as a 
decrease in either g^ or y. A decrease in g^ represents an increase in the probability of failuse 
that is independent of window length. This represents an exogenous change in the probability 
of failure that cannot be ameliorated with self-protection—a constant increase in the 
probability of a failure for all lengths of the effectiveness or application window, q. In 
contrast, a decrease in y represents an increase in the probability of failure that increases 
proportional to q. We can think of it as a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection. An 
example of decreased y can be seen by comparing two farmers in two different climates. 
Suppose for a herbicide to be potent, rain is required during the effectiveness window. If one 
farmer lives in a drier climate than another farmer, the first farmer will find a herbicide with a 
given effectiveness window less active than that of the second farmer. In this case, drier 
climate corresponds to a lower y. 
For the application case (p=0), the comparative static effects of a decrease in g® are 
given by cq /eg® < 0 and 5H /eg® > 0 (see Appendix A), which is summarized by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1: An increase in the probability of application failure (p = 0) due to a decrease 
in the exogenous probability of success, g®, will decrease the optimal application rate of 
herbicide use and increase the length of the optimal application window. 
For the effectiveness case (p = 1), ^q /cg° < 0 and 8H /cg° > 0 (see Appendix A). 
The following corollary summarizes this result. 
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Corollary 1: Assuming damage abatement is globally concave in H, an increase in the 
probability of effectiveness failure (p = 1) due to a decrease in the exogenous probability of 
success, g°, will decrease the optimal application rate of herbicide use and increase the length 
of the optimal effectiveness window. 
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 suggest that an increase in the probability of weed 
control failure will result in producers using lower doses of herbicides but with longer 
effectiveness or application windows. This may be a mixed blessing for the control of 
nonpoint source pollution from agrichemical use. Reconsider Figure 1. As window lengths 
increase, a producer eliminates the strictly nontriazine activities and begins using only 
activities that contain atrazine. In the US Com Belt, atrazine is the most detected herbicide in 
surface water, groundwater, and precipitation [see Goolsby et al. (1991), Holden and Graham 
(1992), and Nations and Hallberg (1992)]. Holden and Graham indicate that the frequency of 
occurrence of herbicides in ground water is due to both the likelihood of their use and their 
persistence in the soil. Of the soil-applied herbicides used in corn, atrazine and simazine (a 
triazine herbicide) have the longest soil half-lives [Becker et al. (1989)]. Although increased 
application or effectiveness failure reduces herbicide loadings by decreasing application rates, 
if the herbicide is more persistent, the potential for nonpoint source pollution may actually 
increase. The main point here is that a change in the probability of weed control failure has an 
effect on both the types and quantities of herbicides used, and the endogenous risk approach 
allows us to model this effect. This is important from a nonpoint pollution standpoint since 
levels of nonpoint pollution and resulting damages are not only dependent on herbicide 
quantities, but also on herbicide types. Predicting the specific effect of changes in herbicide 
quantities and types on levels of nonpoint pollution is best handled using fate and transport 
models. The CEEPES modeling system is an example of a practical use of this approach to 
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link weed control decisions (via WISH) to levels of nonpoint source pollution [see Bouzaher 
et al. (1994)]. 
Note that although Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 give the same result for an 
exogenous decrease in the probability of success, the result occurs for different reasons. In 
the case of Proposition 1 (application failure), an exogenous decrease in the probability of 
success has the direct effect of decreasing the expected marginal cost of self-protection, q, 
thereby increasing the length of the optimal application window. Additionally, q and H are 
stochastic substitutes, inputs where an increase in the optimal level of one input has the 
indirect effect of decreasing the other input. If G is the Hessian matrix of the problem and Gy 
are the minors of G, Hiebert (1983) defines inputs i and j as stochastic substitutes 
(complements) if Gjj < 0 (> 0). Since q and H are stochastic substitutes and an exogenous 
decrease in the probability of success has the direct effect of increasing the length of the 
optimal application window, this in turn decreases the optimal application rate. There is no 
direct effect of an exogenous decrease in the probability of a successfijl application on the 
optimal application rate. In the case of Corollary 1 (effectiveness failure), an exogenous 
decrease in the probability of success has the direct effect of reducing the expected marginal 
benefit of H, thereby decreasing the optimal application rate. Since q and H are stochastic 
substitutes, this in turn increases the length of the optimal effectiveness window. There is no 
direct effect of an exogenous decrease in the probability a herbicide will be effective on the 
length of the optimal effectiveness window. 
In addition, knowledge on how an exogenous increase in the probability of application 
failure affects the net likelihood of a successfijl herbicide application can be useful for 
nonpoint pollution policy. Holding constant parameters such as crop prices, herbicide prices, 
and initial weed density, the effect of an exogenous change in the probability of application 
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failure on the net likelihood of a successful herbicide application is found by differentiating 
g(q )=g°+7h(q ) with respect to g® 
(6) 
The two terms in (6) represent two effects, a direct effect and an indirect effect. The first 
term in (6), which is positive, is the direct effect. This term shows that a decrease in g® has 
the direct effect of decreasing g{q*). The second term is the indirect effect. Proposition 1 
implies that this term is negative, indicating that a decrease in gO increases q and hence has 
the indirect effect of increasing g(q ). The net result depends on which term dommates. If 
the second term exceeds -1, an exogenous increase in the probability of an application failure 
reduces the likelihood of success, resulting in lower doses of herbicide that are more persistent 
but have a smaller likelihood of application. If the second term is less than -1, it is more likely 
the producer will successfully apply the herbicide —^an exogenous increase in the probability 
of an application failure results in lower doses of herbicides with longer persistence having a 
higher likelihood of application.** This possibility is somewhat counterintuitive. It says that an 
exogenous decrease in the probability of a successful herbicide application may cause 
producers to shift to a herbicide with a long enough application window that the probability of 
a successflil application actually increases. 
Now consider the comparative statics of decreased y on the optimal levels of H and q. 
For the application case (p = 0), c'q*/cV > 0 and dH*/dy < 0 (see Appendix B), which is 
summarized below. 
''By assuming that the model parameters remain constant over time we have assumed away the 
effect of weed dynamics on the frequency of application. 
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Proposition 2: An increase in the probability of an application failure (p = 0) due to a 
decrease in the efficacy of self-protection will increase the optimal application rate of 
herbicide use and decrease the length of the optimal application window. 
The result suggests that a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection results in 
herbicides being applied at higher doses but with shorter application windows. Again consider 
Figure 1. An increase in the probability of application failure through a reduction in the 
efficacy of the application window causes a shift from right to left going from the region 
which is predominantly atrazine and other triazine herbicides with longer application windows 
to predominantly non-triazine herbicides with shorter application windows. Application rates 
would also increase relative to the recommended rates. 
As illustrated by Propositions 1 and 2, decreasing gO and y have the opposite effect on 
the optimal values of H and q. This is due to a combination of three factors. First, the first 
order condition (5) implies that the marginal benefit of H in the good state is equal to the unit 
price of H in the good state. This means H is not directly affected by an increase in the 
probability of failure (E7rHg°=E^Hy^'^)' so H* depends only indirectly on g® or y through q"". 
Conversely, q* is directly affected by an increase in the probability of failure (ETiqgO^^O and 
ETCqy^^O), but since H* is not directly affected there is no indirect effect of H* on q*. The net 
result is that q* depends directly on g® or y, while H* depends only on q* and on whether q 
and H are stochastic substitutes or complements. 
Second, equation (A4) implies that q and H are stochastic substitutes, so an increase in 
the probability of failure will shift H in the opposite direction that q shifts. Intuitively, an 
increase in q increases the unit price of herbicide causing the producer to apply less, 
5|C sfC 
decreasing H ; decreasing q decreases the unit price thereby increasing H*. 
Third, examining the first order condition (4), a decrease in g® or y decreases the 
probability a herbicide will be successftilly applied, thereby reducing the expected marginal 
cost of q. However, a decrease in gO leaves the marginal expected benefit of q unchanged, so 
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the producer finds it optimal to increase her expenditure on q . Since q and H are stochastic 
substitutes the producer then reduces her expenditure on H*. In contrast, a decrease in y 
decreases marginal expected benefits of q. Furthermore, the marginal expected benefit 
declines faster than the expected marginal cost, so the producer finds it optimal to decrease 
her expenditure on q . Since q and H are stochastic substitutes, the producer then increases 
her expenditure on H*. 
From a policy standpoint, this indicates the importance of understanding the source of 
increased probability of failure to determine its effect on herbicide use and the relative 
environmental impacts of herbicide application rates and types of herbicides used. Suppose 
we know that a stream flowing through an agricultural area is a critical wildlife feeding area 
and that the aquatic vegetation is sensitive to almost all types of herbicides. Further suppose 
that increased herbicide concentrations reaching this area may cause substantial damage, but a 
shift in the type of herbicide that reaches this area will have little effect. In this case, increased 
probability of failure through a reduction in the efficacy of the application window will result 
in herbicides being applied at higher rates, increasing herbicide concentrations in the stream 
and increasing the potential for environmental damage. But increased probability of failure 
that leaves the efficacy of the application window unchanged results in herbicides being 
applied at lower rates, causing herbicide concentrations and the potential for damage to 
decrease. 
The effect of a decrease in y on the probability of successful application is given by 
^  =  / , ( < ; • ) ( 7 )  
cy ay 
Here both terms are positive, implying herbicides will have a lower probability of being 
applied when y decreases. This suggests that herbicides with shorter application windows will 
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be successfully applied less often but when an application occurs it will be at a higher dose. 
For the effectiveness case (p = 1), /^ > 0 and /^ > 0 if q and H are stochastic 
complements (see Appendix B). This result is summarized below. 
Corollary 2: If self-protection and self-insurance are stochastic complements, an increase in 
the probability of effectiveness failure (p = 1) through a decrease in the efficacy of self-
protection results in a decrease in both the optimal herbicide rate and the optimal length of the 
effectiveness window. 
Intuitively, a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection has the direct effect of decreasing the 
marginal benefit of self-protection, causing the producer to use herbicides with a shorter 
effectiveness window. Also, a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection has the direct effect 
of decreasing the expected marginal benefit of self-insurance, causing the producer to apply 
herbicides at a lower rate. That is, if there is a higher likelihood that a herbicide will be 
ineffective, the producer can reduce the amount of money he will lose simply by applying less 
of it. If self-protection and self-insurance are stochastic complements, a decrease in one has 
the indirect effect of decreasing the other, so both the direct effects and indirect effects move 
in the same direction. In this case a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection decreases the 
optimal levels of self-protection and self-insurance. However, if self-protection and self-
insurance are stochastic substitutes, a decrease in one has the indirect effect of increasing the 
other. In this case, unless we can determine whether the direct effects or the indirect effects 
dominate, we cannot sign the effects of a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection on the 
optimum levels of self-protection and self-insurance. 
If self-protection and self-insurance are stochastic complements, increased probability 
of effectiveness failure results in herbicides with shorter effectiveness windows being applied 
at lower rates. Using Figure 1, we would see a shift from atrazine and other triazine 
herbicides with longer eftectiveness windows to nontriazine herbicides with shorter 
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effectiveness windows. We would also see herbicide application rates decrease relative to the 
recommended rates. 
Note that, although the probability of application or effectiveness failure is associated 
with weather uncertainty, we do not focus specifically on weather uncertainty. This is what 
distinguishes the endogenous risk approach from the exogenous risk approach. We focus on 
the probabilities that are relevant to the decision maker (e.g., application and effectiveness 
risk) and not on the probabilities that are independent of human actions (e.g., weather). 
If we allow the producer to be risk averse instead of risk neutral, our basic approach 
remains the same, except the producer now maximizes expected utility, where the utility 
function is concave in profit. Allowing for risk aversion would require us to consider the 
effects of self-insurance and self-protection on the variability of profit as well as expected 
profit. Recall that an increase in H increases the variability of profit, so we should expect 
herbicide application rates to be lower for a risk averse producer than for a risk neutral 
producer. Self-protection, q, may increase or decrease the variability of profit depending on 
whether the probability of success is low or high. If the probability of success is close to zero, 
variability of profit is low with the weight of the distribution largely on the bad state. An 
increase in q will shift some weight of the distribution from the bad state to the good state 
initially increasing the variability of profit. However, as q continues to increase, the weight of 
the distribution becomes more and more centered on the good state, decreasing the variability 
of profit. In weed control, we generally think of producers choosing herbicides that have a 
high probability of success. In this case we can think of q decreasing variability of profit, so a 
risk averse producer would tend to use herbicides with longer application or effectiveness 
windows than a risk neutral producer. 
However, the comparative statics for a risk averse producer are more complicated. 
The addition of a concave utility fijnction is an additional source of curvature. We now have 
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to understand how an increase in the probability of failure affects the marginal productivities 
of self-insurance and self-protection, and marginal utilities are also affected. In general this 
additional curvature makes the comparative statics ambiguous and additional restrictions will 
be necessary on the risk reducing technologies, risk preferences and their interaction [see 
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) or Shogren and Crocker (1991)]. 
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3. SELF-INSURANCE AND SELF-PROTECTION WITH UNCERTAIN 
PROBABILITIES 
Following the existing literature on endogenous risk, we have presumed that the 
producer is certain of the efficacy of self-protection. However, it is conceivable that the 
efficacy of self-protection is uncertain — the eflFect of self protection on the probability of 
loss is not known with certainty. In weed control this means that the producer is not sure 
how effective added herbicide flexibility or persistence will be in reducing the probability of a 
weed control failure. For example, a producer reads in the extension weed control manual 
that atrazine should be applied during a particular time period. But his own past experience or 
that of his neighbor calls into question the certainty of that advice. This doubt can be 
reflected by the variability of the length of the application or effectiveness window or can be 
manifest in the variability of the efficacy of these windows. He knows the herbicide can 
reduce the probability of failure, but he remains unsure as to the actual capability of the 
window length or window efficacy. We will show that if a producer doubts the self-
protection a herbicide provides, it is again possible that he will increase the use of more 
persistent herbicides applied at lower rates. Intuitively, this says that if a producer is uncertain 
about how effective a herbicide is in reducing the probability of a loss he may respond to this 
uncertainty by choosing a herbicide that provides greater application flexibility or is more 
persistent. 
Consider the problem of choosing the level of self-protection and self-insurance where 
the probabilities of each state occurring are uncertain. The profit-maximizing producer's 
problem is 
h 
Max E5r = J{g(q,f)[PY,[l - D{W)\-c{q)H] + (l - D{W,)] - fx{q)H})dF{s,a). 
A 
(8) 
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This problem is identical to equation (1) except for the addition of the random variable e, 
which enters the probability ftinction g. Assume that a higher s corresponds to a more 
favorable outcome, such that gg > 0, and that the marginal effect of s is declining, ggg < 0, 
Let F(s,a) represent the subjective cumulative distribution flinction for s defined over 
the interval [a,b] where a and b are constants. The parameter a represents the level of 
uncertainty. An increase in a increases uncertainty measured by second order stochastic 
dominance. 
where the first term in (9) represents the mean effect and the second term represents the 
spread effect of a on the distribution. This representation of increased uncertainty includes a 
mean-preserving spread as a special case. An increase in a corresponds to a decrease in the 
expected probability of success. Formally, the expected probability of no weed control failure 
is 
h c 
(9) 
b 
^giq.s) = \g{q,s)dF{s,a). ( 1 0 )  
A 
Differentiating (10) with respect to a, and integrating by parts twice yields 
( 1 1 )  
Increasing a also corresponds to increasing the variance of g(q,s), where the variance is given 
by 
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(12) Var[g(q,e)] = ^g{q,sf(iF{£,a)- ^g{q,£)dF{e,a) 
a L'' 
Differentiate (12) with respect to a, and integrate each term by parts twice, and rearrange 
a^ar[g(7,g)] ^ 2g^{q,e)[\-g{q,s)]\F^{e,a)de + \^g;-2g,X\-g{q,£)^ \F^{z,a)dz 
ca 
> 0 .  
Li8 
(13) 
Intuitively, 8 can reflect producer uncertainty about the length of the application or 
effectiveness window. For uncertain window length, write g(q,e) as g(q+s). The producer 
believes the window length is likely to be q, but it may be a few days longer or a few days 
shorter. An increase in a implies that the length of the window is more variable, while the 
expected window length may be either constant or decreasing. Alternatively, 8 can represent 
uncertainty in the efficacy of the application or effectiveness window. For uncertain window 
efficacy, write g(q,s) as g(q8). The producer believes the window length is likely to 
contribute a set amount to the probability of success but she is not sure exactly what this set 
amount is. Now increasing a implies an increase in the variability of efficacy, while the 
expected efficacy of the window may be constant or decreasing. After defining the general 
model and comparative statics, we will consider both of these cases to illustrate the effects of 
increased uncertainty on the optimal weed control decision. 
The first-order conditions for (8) are 
b 
= j - D(}V)\ - (1 - p)H\g^(q.e)c(q) - ix'(q)H^ilF(e.a) = 0 
LI 
(14) 
and 
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E5r^ =]{-g{q,e)PY,D\W)W\}r^-{\-p)g{q,B)c{q)-pc{q)}dF{e,a) = 0. (15) 
a 
The second-order conditions require E^rj^ < E^qq < 0 and EG h E^^jjE^qq - (E^pjq)^ 
> 0 .  
The comparative statics of an increase in uncertainty for the application case (p = 0) 
are given by 5q*/ca > 0 and cH*/ca < 0 (see Appendix C), which is summarized by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 3: Assuming gqe < 0 and gqgg > 0, an increase in application uncertainty (p = 0) 
decreases the optimal herbicide application rate and increases the length of the optimal 
application window. 
If gqs < 0 and gqse > 0. uncertainty causes producers to use herbicides with a higher 
probability of being applied than those they would use in the absence of uncertainty. It also 
causes producers to apply more expensive herbicides than they would use in the absence of 
uncertainty. 
Similarly, for the effectiveness case (p = 1), if damage abatement is globally concave in 
H, then ^q Ida > 0 and cH /da < 0. This result is summarized below. 
Corollary 3; Assuming gqg < 0 and gqgg > 0 and that damage abatement is globally concave 
in self-insurance, H, an increase in effectiveness uncertainty (p = 1) decreases the optimal 
herbicide application rate and increases the length of the optimal application window. 
If gqg < 0, gqgg > 0 and damage abatement is globally concave in H, uncertainty causes 
producers to use herbicides that have a higher probability of being effective than those they 
would use in the absence of uncertainty. In this case, although uncertainty tends to decrease 
the optimal herbicide application rate, it leads to more flexible and persistent herbicides. Note 
that Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 are similar to Proposition 1 and Corollary 1. This is not 
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too surprising since an increase in application or effectiveness uncertainty reduces the 
expected probability of success, which is the effect we considered in the certain efficacy case. 
Similar to the problem of self-insurance and self-protection with certain efficacy, an increase 
in application uncertainty has no direct effect on herbicide application rates since this decision 
occurs as the herbicide is being applied. Also similar is that an increase in effectiveness 
uncertainty has the direct effect of increasing the probability a herbicide application will be 
wasted thereby decreasing the amount of herbicide applied. Both the certain and uncertain 
efficacy cases also require restrictions on the curvature of the probability functions to achieve 
this result. While we assumed a specific functional form for the certainty case, we consider a 
more general probability function for the uncertainty case. The conditions gqg < 0 and gqgg > 
0 imply that gq is decreasing or constant and is convex in 8. Intuitively, this means self-
protection is less effective in shifting the probability of success as s increases, but this decrease 
in effectiveness diminishes as e increases. This has different implications for the shape of 
g(q,E) depending on how g enters the model. We now consider the implications of both 
uncertain window length and efficacy. 
3.1 Uncertain Window Length 
Consider the case of uncertain window length represented by g(q,e) = g(q+s). In this 
case, gqs(q+e) = g'Xq+e) gqS8(c[+s) = g"'(q'^s). If we think of g(q,s) as a cumulative 
distribution function, the condition gqg < 0 implies that the probability distribution function, 
g'(q+E), is nonincreasing which is guaranteed by our assumption that ggg < 0. The condition 
gq88 > 0 implies the probability distribution function is a convex function. Using a parallel 
argument to the idea of nonincreasing Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion, Shogren (1991) 
shows that g'"(q+s) > 0 if we assume nonincreasing aversion to uncertain protection 
efficiency. That is, the marginal efficacy of the probability fijnction is convex if a producer's 
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willingness to pay a protection premium decreases monotonically with the level of self-
protection. A protection premium is defined as the amount an individual is willing to pay to 
remove the uncertainty about the efficacy of self-protection [see Shogren proposition 2], 
For g(q,8) = g(q+e), distributions that meet both the conditions gqg < 0 and gqgg > 0 
include the exponential and Pareto distributions. Intuitively, the exponential distribution 
makes sense for the application uncertainty model since the probability of successflil 
application can be described as a waiting time problem. For the application problem, success 
occurs when weather conditions permit an application. Let 0 represent the probability of a 
successful application occurring during an interval t+At. Following Freund and Walpole 
(1980), if the probability of more than one success during that interval is negligible and the 
probability of success during such an interval does not depend on what happened before t, 
then the probability of zero successes during an interval of length q+e is given by e"®(l'^s). 
The probability of at least one success during interval q+e is then the exponential cumulative 
distribution function 1- e"6(l"^^). 
We use the WISH model to explore the relationship between the length of the primary 
application window and the probability that a herbicide is successfully applied. Let e = 0 
represent the weed control strategies as defined by Bouzaher et al. (1992). We modify each 
strategy by adding or subtracting days from the window lengths defined in WISH and 
rerunning the simulation. For example, e = 1 represents adding one day to the application 
window, and e = - I represents subtracting one day from the application window. With the 
new values generated with WISH, we estimate coefficients for both a linear and an 
exponential model. The linear model is given by 
g(q+8) = Bo + 1 (q+s) + (32d 1 (q+s) (16) 
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where dj is a dummy variable for application timing. Let d] = 0 represent early preplant 
applications and dj = 1 represent preemergence applications. Similarly, the exponential model 
is given by 
giq^-S) r: (17) 
where dj is defined as in the linear model. 
Separate models were fit for sand and clay soil types. Table 1 presents the results for 
both models. Numbers in parentheses are the standard errors. Both models provide a good 
fit for the data. The assumption that gq>0 and ge>0 imply that Pi+P2di>0 for the linear 
model and that Pi+P2di<0 for the exponential model. For the linear model, Pj represents the 
marginal effect of the early preplant window length on the probability of a successful 
application. The estimated Pj for a sandy soil in the linear model is .0226, indicating that 
each additional day added to the early preplant window length increases the probability of a 
Table I. Uncertain Window Length—Estimated Probability Function Coefficients 
Soil Type — Sand Soil Type —clay 
(n=3 5) (n=35) 
Linear Exponential Linear Exponential 
Bo .1128 .0753 I30 .0680 .0442 
(.0194) (.0244) (.0133) (.0164) 
Bl .0226 -.0470 I3l .0196 -.0338 
(.0010) (.0014) (.0007) (.0009) 
B2 .0073 -.0147 132 .0067 -.0116 
(.0009) (.0015) (.0006) (.0009) 
R2 
.9465 NA .9656 NA 
MSE .00095 .00048 .00045 .00029 
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successful application by 2.26%. Similarly, for a clay soil, each additional day added to the 
early preplant application window increases the probability of a successful application by 
1.96%. Also for the linear model P1+P2 represents the marginal effect of the preemergence 
window length on the probability of a successful application. Each additional day added to 
the preemergence application window increases the probability of a successful application by 
2.99% for a sandy soil, and 2.63% for a clay soil. The coefficient Pq represents the 
probability of successful application that is not affected by window length. Regardless of 
window length, there is at least an 11.28% probability of successful application on sandy soils 
and at least a 6.80% probability of successfial application on clay soils. For the exponential 
model, represents the marginal effect of the early preplant application 
window length on the probability of a successful application and 
represents the marginal effect of preemergence application 
window length on the probability of a successful application. Unlike the linear model, these 
marginal effects are not constant. 
The estimated coefficients for both the linear and non-linear models all have the 
appropriate sign. Also, as expected for a probability function, neither of the estimated 
functions has a range outside the interval [0,1 ] over the domain of data from which they were 
estimated. Although there is little evidence to select the exponential over the linear model, 
there is no evidence to reject it either. If the exponential model provides the best fit. then 
Proposition 3 holds unambiguously. But if the linear model provides a better fit, then from 
equation (C6) we can see that most of the terms disappear due to gqg = gqgg = ggg = 0. The 
only remaining effect is the mean effect which implies 
b 
^ ^  (18) 
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Therefore, this implies that for all but a mean-preserving spread, the implications of 
Proposition 3 hold unambiguously.® This suggests that the main effect of increased 
uncertainty will occur from a change in the mean of the distribution rather than from the 
spread of the distribution for uncertain window length. 
If a producer is uncertain about the window length associated with different 
herbicides, increased uncertainty is likely to lead to reduced herbicide application rates and to 
use of herbicides with longer application or effectiveness windows. From an environmental 
standpoint, when herbicides are successfully applied we have lower loadings of more 
persistent herbicides. Also, since herbicides with longer application windows have a higher 
probability of successful application, uncertainty in window length tends to increase the 
likelihood that herbicides will be applied. 
3.2 Uncertain Window Efficacy 
Now consider uncertain window efficacy represented by g(q,s) = gCqe). In this case, 
gqs = g"(qs)qe + g'(qs) and gqss = g"'(qs)q-s + 2g"(qs)q. Now gqs < 0 if and only if 
-g"(qs)qs/g'(qE) > 1. The term r|(qe) = - g"(qs)q8/g'(qe) is the elasticity of the marginal 
probability of success. Similar to Shogren (1991), we might think of q as a measure of 
relative aversion to uncertain protection efficiency. For a simple self-protection problem, q 
indicates the size of a multiplicative protection premium, 
A sufficient condition for gqg < 0 is for the probability density function, g'(qe), to 
always be elastic. Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1986) suggest that this is a reasonable 
assumption for a probability density function for damage control problems. For common 
distributions including many gamma, exponential, and Pareto distributions, g'(qs) is elastic if 
qe is bounded sufficiently far from zero. Arrow (1984, ch. 9) shows that relative risk aversion 
'A mean-preserving spread implies that = 0. Therefore, cq*/f;a = 0 and dH*lca = 0. 
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tends to a limit below one as wealth approaches zero. Similarly, r\ approaches a limit below 
one as qe approaches zero, implying that we need to restrict qe away from zero if we want to 
maintain t] > 1. 
This bound, r| > 1, may be very restrictive for some distributions and may impose little 
restriction for others. For example, consider the Pareto distribution g(q£) = 1 - (k/(qs))® for 
qe > k > 0 and 0 > 0. The elasticity of the marginal probability of success is n 9+ 1 > 1. 
Requiring r| > 1 places no additional restrictions on qe. Alternatively, consider the 
exponential distribution g(qe) = 1 - e"®^^ for qe > 0 and 9 > 0. The elasticity of the marginal 
probability of success is nCqs) = 9qe. Requiring r| > 1 implies that qe > 1/9, which in turn 
implies that g(q*e) > 1 - e"^ =s 0.632 for all e in [a,b]. Now we can guarantee that gqg < 0 
only if the producer chooses an optimal window length certain to result in at least a 63% 
probability of success. 
Consider now the restriction gqee > 0, Assuming g"(qs) < 0 and q 0, then gqgg > 0 
if and only if -g"'(qe)qs/g"(qE) > 2. Again this holds for many distributions if qe is bounded 
away from zero. This imposes no Rirther restrictions on a Pareto distribution, but for an 
exponential distribution it implies that qe > 2/9. In this case, g(q e) > 1 - e"- == 0.865, so we 
can guarantee that gqgg > 0 only if the producer chooses an optimal window length that he is 
certain will result in at least an 87% probability of success. In general. 
g"(ie) n 
then -g"'(q£)q£/g"(qE) > 2 if and only if [1 + r) - (n'qs)/ t]] > 2. 
Figure 2 illustrates the regions in which we can unambiguously sign Proposition 3 and 
Corollary 3 for uncertain window efficacy. The elasticity of self-protection is represented on 
the horizontal axis, while the relative marginal elasticity (n'qs) is represented on the vertical. 
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Ila 
Figure 2. Restrictions on uncertain window 
Corollary 3 
efficacy to unambiguously sign Proposition 3 and 
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Regions I & III represent the cases that violate either of the two restrictions—rj >1 or [1 + r| 
- (Tl'qe)/r|] > 2. Region II represents the cases that satisfy both restrictions. If ri'qe lies 
entirely in region II for all s in [a,b], our results hold. Assuming t) > 1, a sufficient condition 
for -g"'(qe)qs /g"(q8) >2 is rj' < 0, implying rj'qs at the optimum lies entirely in region lib 
where the probability is elastic, and the elasticity is decreasing. This is the most restrictive set 
of sufficient conditions. We can weaken these restrictions by allowing the elasticity to 
increase, but at a slow enough rate to stay in region lla. In addition, if we consider a mean-
preserving spread in e such that 
then the mean effect in equation (C6) disappears, and we no longer require ri > 1. Therefore, 
our results hold if riqs lies entirely in regions II and III for all s in [a,b]. Eliminating the 
mean effect removes the restriction that the elasticity must exceed unity, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 hold. In general, sufficient conditions to 
sign the effects of increased uncertainty on q* and H* are that the marginal productivity of 
success is elastic and the elasticity is nonincreasing in qs over the interval [q*a, q*b]. 
Again using the weed control strategies from the WISH model, we model uncertain 
window efficacy as uncertainty in the amount of crop land that can be treated in a day. Let s 
represent the percentage of land that can be treated in one day. For example, if a producer 
requires four days to treat all of his com acres, then e = 0.25. With the values generated by 
WISH, we estimated coefficients for a linear model, an exponential model, and a Pareto 
model. Observations were generated for s = 0.1665, s = 0.2, s = 0.25, e = 0.333, and 8 = 0.5, 
covering producers requiring from two to six days to apply herbicides to all of their corn 
acres. In this specification the product qe represents the maximum treatment percent, that is 
the percentage of acreage that could be treated if there were no weather delays. 
h 
(20) 
ll 
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We use dummy variables to represent alternative timings in both the linear and 
exponential models, with the linear model given by 
8(qe) = 60 + Biqs + B2diqe + 63^2^^' (21) 
and the exponential model given by 
= J _  g A ] ( 2 2 )  
In both models let d j =0 represent early preplant and postemergence applications and d | = 1 
represent preemergence applications. Also, let d2 = 0 represent early preplant and 
preemergence applications and d2 = 1 represent postemergence applications. We also 
estimate separate models for each timing with the Pareto specification. 
giqs)  = 1 -
V 
(23) 
where 31 >0 and Pi + qs > K. After testing alternative specifications, the parameter K was 
set at the smallest observed qs value for each timing. 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results for the linear and exponential models, and the Pareto 
models. The assumption that gq>0 and gg>0 imply that Pi+P2dis+P3d2e>0 and 
Pl+P2diq+P3d2q>0 for the linear model, and that Pi+P2dis+P3d2S<0 and 
Pl+P2diq+P3d2q<0 for the exponential model. Also, these assumptions imply that Pq^O for 
the Pareto model. With the linear model, Pj represents the marginal effect of changing the 
maximum early preplant treatment percentage (i.e. using larger equipment, working longer 
days, or driving faster) on the probability of a successful application. Similarly, P1+P2 
represents the marginal effect of changing maximum preemergence treatment percentage on 
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Table 2. Uncertain Window Efficacy—Estimated Probability Function Coefficients 
Soil Type — Sand Soil Type — clay 
(n=40) (n=40) 
Linear Exponential Linear Exponential 
Bo .2652 .0720 BO .1750 .0341 
(.0255) (.0316) (.0198) (.0244) 
Bl .0550 -.1810 Bl .0527 -.1279 
(.0045) (.0078) (.0035) (.0056) 
B2 .0137 -.0550 B2 .0149 -.0407 
(.0068) (.0096) (.0052) (.0073) 
B3 .0248 -.0949 B3 .0242 -.0652 
(.0046) (.0086) (.0036) (.0061) 
R2 
.8601 NA .9040 NA 
MSE .00520 .00116 .00314 .00112 
Table 3. Uncertain Window Efficacy—Estimated Pareto Distribution Coefficients 
Soil Type Soil Type 
by Application Timing by Application Timing 
— Sand — Clay 
Earlv Pre- Post- Earlv Pre- Posl-
Prcplant Emergence Emergence Preplan! Emergence Emergencc 
(n=Li) (n=10) (n=15) (n=15) (n=10) {n=15) 
Bo 1.2286 .7370 1.4965 Bo .9115 .5567 1.0857 
(.0603) (.0329) (.0817) (.0603) (.0261) (.0636) 
Bl 2.1334 .4279 1.2375 Bl 2.0928 .4216 1.2032 
(.1941) (.0857) (.1146) (.1469) (.1003) (.1416) 
MSE .00129 .00109 .00201 MSE .00063 .00106 .00253 
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the probability of successful application, and P1+P3 represents the marginal effect of changing 
maximum postemergence treatment percentage on the probability of a successful application. 
For the estimated coefficients on a sandy soil each percent increase in maximum treated acres 
increases the probability of a successful application by 5.50% for early preplant applications, 
6.87% for preemergence applications, and 7.98% for postemergence applications. For the 
estimated coefficients on a clay soil each percent increase in maximum treated acres increases 
the probability of a successful application by 5.27% for early preplant applications, 6.76% for 
preemergence applications, and 7.69% for postemergence applications. Also for the linear 
model, the coefficient Po represents the probability of successful application that is 
independent of the maximum treatment percentage. For a sandy soil, there is at least a 
26.52% probability of successful application, and for a clay soil there is at least a 17.50% 
probability of successful application. With the exponential model 
represents the marginal effect of 
maximum treatment percentage on the probability of a successful application. Unlike the 
linear model, this effect is not constant, but it is positive as expected for all herbicide timings. 
With the Pareto model PoK^^o(Pl"*'1s)^'^"'^0^ represents the marginal effect of maximum 
treatment percentage on the probability of a successfial application. Again unlike the linear 
model this effect is not constant, but the effect is positive as expected for all herbicide timings 
and soil types. The estimated coefficients for all of the models have the appropriate sign. As 
expected for a probability fiinction, none of the estimated fianctions has a range outside the 
interval [0,1] over the domain of data from which they were estimated. Although the R-
values for the linear model are large, residual plots indicate that the linear model does not fit 
the data as well as the exponential model. Similarly residual plots indicate that the Pareto 
models do not give as good a fit as the exponential model. However, given the small number 
71 
of observations used to estimate the Pareto models it is difficult to make a conclusive 
judgment. 
Recall that if the Pareto model holds, we can unambiguously conclude that Proposition 
3 holds—cq Ida. > 0 and cH /ca < 0 for all application timings and soil types. If the 
exponential model holds, however, we need to satisfy two conditions to make these 
predictions—rj > 1 and -g"'(qE)qs/g"(q£) > 2. For the exponential model, n = 
-(Bl+B2di+B3d2)qe and -g"'(q£)q8/g"(qe) = - (6[+B2di+63d2)qe. Given our estimates, the 
condition r\ > 1 requires q > 33.2 for early preplant applications on sand, q > 25.5 for 
preemergence applications on sand, and q* > 21.8 for postemergence applications on sand. 
On clay, the condition requires q* > 47.0, q* > 35.6, and q* > 31.1 for the respective timings. 
Since 8 < q < 25 for the strategies defined in WISH, the condition r) > 1 can only be satisfied 
for postemergence applications on sand. 
The second condition -g"'(q8)qs/g"(qs) > 2 requires q* > 66.4, q* > 50.9, and q* > 
43,5 for early preplant, preemergence, and postemergence applications on sand, and q > 
93.9, q >71.2, and q > 62.2 for the respective timings on clay. This condition is not 
satisfied for any timing or soil type. Therefore, even if the exponential model holds, it is 
possible that the opposite result predicted by Proposition 3 occurs— cq /da < 0 and 
cH*A?a > 0. 
These results lead to two observations. First, as do those of Lichtenberg and 
Zilberman (1986), our findings reinforce the importance of functional form. At present, 
more field data are needed to determine the most appropriate ftinctional form for uncertain 
window efficacy. Second, our findings support the importance of two theoretical constraints 
paralleling Arrow's (1984, ch. 9) observations on relative risk aversion. We can show that n 
approaches a limit below unity as qe approaches zero and that ri approaches a limit above 
unity as qs approaches infinity. This indicates that the conditions q > 1 and n' < 0 are violated 
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for some qs in the interval 0 < qe < oo. Our exponential model shows that these theoretical 
constraints are binding over the relatively small interval aq* < qe < bq*' where a = 0.1665 and 
b = 0.5. 
In sum, for certain probability functions, we can conclude that uncertainty about self-
protection will lead to herbicides with longer application or effectiveness windows being used 
at lower application rates. Again this implies lower loadings of more persistent herbicides 
when an application occurs, but it also implies a greater probability of successfiil application. 
However, these results are less convincing in the uncertain window efficacy specification than 
in the uncertain window length specification. 
Again, if we drop the assumption of risk neutrality, and allow for risk averse 
producers, the results are still complicated by the necessity to consider effects of self-
protection and self-insurance on the variability of profit as well as expected profit. The net 
result depends on the relative curvature in the utility fianction compared to curvature in the 
profit fijnction. As before, the direction of the comparative statics for a risk averse producer 
are more difficult to determine due to the interaction of tastes and technology [Babcock and 
Shogren (1995)]. 
73 
4. CONCLUSION 
The concept of endogenous risk allows us to escape the simplified assumption that the 
likelihood of weed damage is beyond the control of a producer. As a result this approach 
provides a theoretical framework that allows us to capture some of the complexity involved in 
weed control decisions, and particulariy to model decisions involving herbicide types as well 
as herbicide quantities. 
Endogenous risk in weed control management reveals two key points—a clear trade­
off between the herbicide application rate and flexibility or persistence, and the idea that the 
source of a probability change affects this tradeoff First, a policy maker concerned with 
nonpoint source pollution must understand the trade-off between the type and quantity of 
herbicides used. Policies that seem to reduce pollution because they reduce total mass may 
induce substitution to chemicals more damaging or more likely to be transported to sensitive 
areas (e.g., low dose sulfonylureas such as nicosulfiaron and primisulfuron). This point is 
supported by Wagenet and Hutson (1991) who indicate that the fate and transport of 
pesticides in the soil depend on specific characteristics such as persistence and total mass. 
Our endogenous risk framework captures the mechanisms behind this trade-off. 
Second, different sources for changes in probability have different implications for 
weed control. An increase in the exogenous probability of loss—probability that cannot be 
ameliorated by self-protection—will decrease application rates and increase persistence. 
Similarly, uncertain .window length will decrease rates and increase persistence. In contrast, 
a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection, will decrease persistence and may increase 
application rates. Finally, for uncertain window efficacy, definitive predictions are difficult to 
guarantee. Based on the elasticity of the probability function, we provide a set of conditions 
to unambiguously sign the eflFects of uncertain window efficacy, but our empirical results 
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reveal a need for additional field data to determine conclusively whether these conditions are 
satisfied. 
There are several extensions to our model that may prove usefial. The first is 
determining the importance of risk reducing technologies relative to risk preferences on weed 
control strategies. By focusing on risk neutral producers we were better able to see the 
technological effects of herbicide use on weed control decisions. There needs to be fiarther 
empirical work to determine the importance of these technological considerations relative to 
taste considerations embodied in risk aversion [see Babcock and Shogren (1995)]. Second, 
our model did not consider the market effects of policy decisions. This may be realistic for 
policies targeted to limited areas where shifts in herbicide use might not be expected to have 
an effect on herbicide and crop prices. However, large scale policies such as nation-wide bans 
of key herbicides such as atrazine may have significant effects on crop prices and the prices of 
other herbicides. Third, our model considered a single herbicide treatment. In reality, 
producers generally have the option of treating herbicide escapes with additional herbicides or 
cultivation. The availability of treatments for weed escapes may have a significant effect on 
both the quantities and types of herbicides used. This remains to be determined. 
We conclude by stressing our main point. In general, self-protection and self-
insurance in weed control can be viewed as stochastic substitutes. Therefore, nonpoint source 
pollution policies aimed at restricting one will likely increase the other. Furthermore, we 
know that increases in the probability of application failure will lead to a trade-off between 
herbicide rates and persistence. The net environmental effect will depend on the relative 
importance of herbicide loadings and persistence. 
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APPENDIX A 
The comparative static effects of a decrease in gO representing increased probability of 
application or effectiveness failure are 
-,0 ~  ^  ( A l )  
^ J og 
and 
?/* r 1 
— = + E;r^^„E7r^Hj / G (A^) 
The first two terms on the right-hand-side of (Al) represent the direct effects of a change in 
djC 
the probability of failure on q , while the second two terms are the indirect effect on q 
through a change in H . Similarly, the first two and second two terms in (A2) are the direct 
and indirect effects of a change in the probability of failure on H . The sign of Ertqf^ defines 
whether the inputs are stochastic substitutes or stochastic complements. If G is the Hessian 
matrix of the problem and Gjj are the minors of G, Hiebert (1983) defines inputs i and j as 
stochastic substitutes (complements) if Gjj < 0 (> 0). In our model, stochastic substitutes are 
inputs where an increase in the optimal level of one input has the indirect effect of decreasing 
the optimal level of the other input. Stochastic complements are inputs where an increase in 
one input indirectly increases the other input. 
To determine the effect of a change in the probability of failure on the optimal window 
length and application rate, we need to sign all of the terms in equations (Al) and (A2). 
Using the first-order condition (5), Etih = 0, we know 
E;r„^„ = -PY,D'mW'{H)-{\-p)c{q). (A3) 
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Additionally, using the first-order condition (4), E7tq=0, we can write 
E^qH = -g'{.q)PY,,D'{W)W'{H) -  (l -  p)[g'{q)c{q) + g(,q)c'{q)\ -  fx\q) 
= -(1 - p)g{qy{q) -  pg\q)Py<> D{W,) + 
H 
(A4) 
Using the first-order condition (4), Eiiq = 0, and given c'(q) > 0, we also know 
E;r^^.,=-{I-p)c'(q)H. (A5) 
Thus, for the application case (p = 0), ErcHg® = 0, < 0, and ETiqgO < 0. Assuming 
second-order conditions hold, cq*/rgO < 0 and c H*/cgO > 0. 
For the efFectiveness case (p = 1), ETt^gO > 0 and Ercqg® = 0, but the sign of Ertqn is 
ambiguous. If herbicide use is considered damage abatement, the term [D(Wq)-D(W)]/H 
represents average damage abatement, and the term -D'(W)W'(H) represents marginal damage 
abatement. In general, although we cannot determine which term is larger, if we assume 
abatement is always concave in H, then average abatement exceeds marginal abatement, 
implying ETCq^ < 0 and dq*/dg^ < 0 and cH*/5gO > 0. 
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APPENDIX B 
A decrease in y increases the probability of failure by reducing the efficacy of self-protection 
such that 
dq * 
and 
cH (B2) 
6> 
Differentiating and Euq with respect to y yields 
E;r,„ = -h{q)PY,D'{W)W\H) -  (l -  p)Kq)c{q\ (B3) 
and using ETi:q=0, yields 
(1 - p)g"c'{q)H 
• p[h'(q)n[Lm^- D{W)^>0-
(B4) 
Uy > 
For the application case (p = 0), given Ett^ = 0, then ETi^y 0. Assuming second-order 
conditions hold and noting that ETiqy > 0 from (B4) and Euq^ < 0 from (A4), then cq 
0 and cH*/ay < 0. 
For the effectiveness case (p = I), equations (B3) and (B4) imply Ek^y ^ 0 Enqy 
> 0, while the sign of Ertqpj is ambiguous. If we assume damage abatement is globally 
concave in H, then ETtq^ < 0, and the signs of cq /cy and cH /cV remain ambiguous. But if 
q and H are stochastic complements, which implies that EjCq^ > 0, then cq /cy > 0 and 
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5H ldy> 0. Note that, for application failure, a decrease in the efficacy of self-protection has 
a direct effect on q but no direct effect on H . Alternatively, for effectiveness failure, a 
decrease in the efficacy of self-protection has a direct effect on both q* and H*. 
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APPENDIX C 
 ^ 3^ ( 
The comparative statics of an increase in uncertainty on q and H are given by 
cq 
= + E^H«E^Hq] / eg (CI) 
and 
cH 
— = [-ES„„ES„ + EJ„EJ,„]/E& {C2) 
Assuming the second-order conditions hold, we need to sign E E ^ Hq ~ E and 
E ^ qa equations (C1) and (C2). Consider each in turn. Differentiating E with 
respect to a, integrating by parts twice, using (14), and assuming Eg(q,e) ^ 0 yields 
i i 
6 
Jf;(2,a)c/r ds ^  < 0. (C3) 
For application uncertainty (p = 0), E^r^a = 0. For effectiveness uncertainty (p = 1), E^i_iot 
< 0 .  
The cross-effect term, E ^pjq, for application uncertainty (p = 0) is given by 
o 
E^,/, = -\c'{q)g{q,£)dF{s,a) < 0. (C4) 
This result, combined with the observation that E^hq^ = 0 for application uncertainty, implies 
that a change in uncertainty regarding the probability of a successful application will cause q 
and H to move in opposite directions. Producers who face greater application uncertainty 
will either choose herbicides with longer application windows and apply them at lower rates, 
or choose herbicides with shorter application windows and apply them at higher rates. 
For effectiveness uncertainty (p =1), using (14) we can write the cross-effect term as 
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= PYo 
D(W,)-D(W) 
H 
+ D'(}V)W'(H) 
o 
\gM^s)dF(,s,a). (C5) 
The second-order condition EJrjQ^ < 0 requires damage abatement to be locally concave in H. 
If we assume damage abatement is globally concave in H, average abatement exceeds 
marginal abatement, implying < 0. Recognizing E^^q < 0 is again useful for policy 
analysis. The negative cross-term effect indicates that producers see herbicide application 
rates and herbicide persistence as stochastic substitutes. Therefore, a policy designed to 
restrict herbicide application rates should result in the use of more persistent herbicides. A 
policy designed to restrict persistence should be expected to induce higher application rates. 
Differentiating E^q with respect to a, integrating by parts twice, using (13), and 
assuming Egq(q,s);tO yields 
E.? „ = c'{ci)H{ {\-p)Eg{-)+p 
Eg„() 
(l-p)E^() + /7 
^F^{s,a)d£ 
Eg,(-) j/<;(r,a)c/- ds}. 
(C6) 
In general, the sign of E^qa is ambiguous. But if gqg < 0 and gqss > 0, then E^qa > 0 for 
both cases of application and effectiveness uncertainty. 
Given (C3); (C4), and (C6), if gqg < 0, gq^g > 0 and p = 0, then cq*/ca > 0 and 
dvClda < 0. Similarly, given (C3), (C5), and (C6), if gqg < 0, gqgg > 0, p = 1, and damage 
abatement is globally concave in H, then dc\lda > 0 and cH*/ca < 0. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
To find efficient and effective policies for reducing agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution we need a thorough understanding of the economic and environmental relationships 
involved in agricultural production. This task is complicated by the inherent difficulty in 
monitoring nonpoint pollution and the fact that nonpoint pollution is significantly affected by 
random weather events. Given the high cost of widespread nonpoint pollution monitoring, the 
use of emission-based policies to control nonpoint pollution is not practical 
In recent years, considerable progress has been made in developing models to predict 
nonpoint pollution processes. These models can be useful tools for developing, implementing 
and evaluating the effects of alternative nonpoint pollution policies. Griffin and Bromley 
(1982) put forth the idea of using models to predict nonpoint pollution and construct 
"nonpoint production flinctions'. Using this approach they argued that input taxes, and farm 
management practice standards could be equally as efficient as emission taxes and emission 
standards in reducing nonpoint pollution. However, by explicitly taking into consideration the 
stochastic nature of nonpoint pollution, Shortle and Dunn (1986) showed that input taxes 
should generally outperform the other policy instruments. Furthermore, Shortle and Dunn 
showed that none of the four policy instruments considered would lead to a first-best solution 
if there is more than one polluting farm. They also argued that nonpoint pollution models 
might be used to insure that the input taxes are appropriately specified to achieve a second-
best solution. Some examples of the use of such models to find second-best solutions include 
Johnson et al. (1991), Mapp et al. (1994), and Lakshminarayan et al. (1994). 
Johnson et al. used biophysical modeling to analyze the economic and environmental 
effects of alternative policies aimed at reducing nitrate contamination of groundwater. The 
policies analyzed included restricting the quantity of nitrogen applied, restrictions on total 
nitrate leachate, an input tax, and a Pigouvian tax on predicted leachate. Johnson et. al 
indicated that the leachate tax was a more effective policy than an input tax, but the leachate 
tax was of limited practical value due to the high cost of implementing such a policy. 
Curiously, no conclusions were drawn about the relative efficiencies of the other policies. 
Mapp et al. used biophysical modeling to analyze the economic and environmental 
effects of alternative policies aimed at reducing nitrate pollution of both groundwater and 
surface water. They considered both broad-based and targeted restrictions of nitrogen use. 
No tax policies were considered. Similarly, Lakshminarayan et al. compared the 
environmental and economic effects of herbicide bans and restrictions on herbicide use to 
improve water quality. Again no tax policies were considered. 
Given the theoretical implications of Shortle and Dunn, it would seem appropriate to 
show empirically how input tax policies compare to other nonpoint pollution policies. None 
of the existing studies do this. Our approach is to expand on the work of Lakshminarayan et 
al. to see if tax policies are able to outperform herbicide bans. We use the CEEPES modeling 
system to construct alternative taxes targeting herbicide characteristics and tillage practices. 
The model is then used to generate trade-off frontiers comparing the effects of each policy 
tool on producer net returns and measures of groundwater and surface water quality. 
Our results indicate that tax policies based on predicted groundwater exposures are 
efficient tools for achieving groundwater quality improvements, however an atrazine ban is 
equally as efficient for achieving the greatest improvement. No one policy tool was found to 
be globally efficient for simultaneously improving both groundwater and surface water quality. 
Since no one policy works for all goals, we define an efficient policy set. This policy set 
shows which policies are most efficient for achieving different levels of water quality 
improvement. Giving equal weights to improvements in groundwater and surface water 
quality, the exposure based taxes are most efficient for producing small improvements in 
water quality while flat taxes are most efficient for producing larger improvements in water 
quality. An atrazine ban is most efficient as a limiting case of the exposure based taxes for 
producing intermediate improvements In water quality. 
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2. POLICIES 
We examine the tradeoffs involved with 6 different sets of policies: 5 sets of tax 
policies, and 1 set of bans. The bans include an atrazine ban and a ban of all triazine 
herbicides. The tax policies are: Flat tax— flat taxes on all com and sorghum herbicides; 
HAL tax— taxes on each herbicide weighted according to the lifetime heahh advisory level 
for that herbicide; Aquatic tax— taxes on each herbicide weighted according to the aquatic 
benchmark for that herbicide; Exposure tax— taxes on each herbicide according to the 
predicted baseline 1.2M groundwater chronic exposure value for that herbicide; and Tillage-
exposure tax— taxes for each herbicide and tillage combination weighted according to the 
predicted baseline 1.2M groundwater chronic exposure value by tillage for that herbicide. 
The policies we consider first are the atrazine ban and the triazine ban. The triazine 
ban includes banning atrazine, cyanazine, and simazine. Bans or restrictions on herbicide use 
have been the focus of several analyses of herbicide regulations (see, for example, Taylor and 
Frohberg 1977, Osteen and Kuchler 1987, Burton and Martin 1987, Taylor et al. 1991, 
NAPIAP 1992, Lakshminarayan et al. 1994). This is a natural first step since the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can carry out such a policy by changing the labels of 
herbicides or by canceling the registrations of a herbicides. 
However, given the implications of Griffin and Bromley (1982) and Shortle and Dunn 
(1986), we should be able to find input tax policies that are more efficient at achieving 
improvements in water quality. The first tax policy we consider is a flat tax on all herbicides. 
This policy is chosen because it is easy to implement since it is targeted toward pounds active 
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ingredient of each herbicide without requiring additional information about each herbicide. 
The idea of a flat herbicide tax is to make herbicides with low application rates more attractive 
than herbicides with high application rates. This should reduce the total pounds of herbicide 
applied and with the aim of reducing quantities of herbicides reaching water supplies and 
causing environmental damage. 
To see if we can improve upon a flat tax using information about specific herbicides, 
the next two tax policies we consider are the HAL tax and the Aquatic tax. These taxes are 
based on two out of the three environmental benchmarks listed in Table 1. These benchmarks 
Table 1. Environmental benchmarks for each herbicide (parts per billion) 
Lifetime 10-day Aquatic 
Herbicide HAL HAL benchmark 
Atrazine -> J 100 2 
Nicosulfliron 44 44 0.03 
Dicamba 9 300 1 
Cyanazine 9 100 2 
Bromoxynil 140 700 1 
Bentazon 20 25 1 
Metolachlor 100 100 1 
EPTC 175 875 1 
Alachlor 2 100 1 
Simazine 35 50 500 
Pendimethalin 300 1400 1 
Propachlor 70 350 1 
Glyphosate 700 20000 60 
Butylate 50 2400 1 
2,4-D 70 1100 1 
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are non-enforceable standards offered by the EPA as guidance for interpreting risks. The 
HAL tax is based on the lifetime health advisory level for each herbicide. The lifetime HAL is 
a measure for comparing the relative health risks of long-term consumption of herbicides in 
drinking water. Holding the concentrations of herbicides in water supplies equal, herbicides 
with a low lifetime HAL present a higher relative health risk. The idea of the HAL tax is to 
encourage substitutions from herbicides that are more likely to produce heahh risks if they 
reach water supplies to herbicides that are less likely to produce health risks if they reach 
water supplies. Similarly, the Aquatic tax is based on the aquatic benchmark. The aquatic 
benchmark is a measure for comparing the relative risks of damage to aquatic habitat. 
Holding the concentrations of herbicides in water supplies equal, herbicides with a low aquatic 
benchmark present a higher risk of aquatic habitat damage. The idea of the Aquatic tax is to 
encourage substitutions from herbicides which are more likely to damage non-target plants if 
they reach water supplies to herbicides which are less likely to damage non-target plants if 
they reach water supplies. 
We do not compute a tax based on the 10-day HAL since herbicide concentrations in 
water supplies generally do not reach these levels. However we do use this benchmark to 
analyze the effects of alternative policies on short-term health risks. 
Finally, to see if information from simulation models can be used to improve the 
efficiency of input tax policies, we consider an Exposure tax and a Tillage-exposure tax. 
These policies are based on exposure values, which are unitless measures of predicted 
groundwater and surface water concentrations normalized using EPA environmental 
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benchmarks. Exposure values capture both the predicted quantities of herbicides reaching 
water supplies and the relative risks the herbicides pose once they reach water supplies. The 
exposure value is calculated as: 
, predicted concentration] 
exposure valuer = — (1) 
environmental benchmarku 
where i=environmental benchmark and j=herbicide. The tillage-exposure value is calculated 
as; 
predicted concentrationjk 
exposure valueuk = — (2) 
environmental benchmarku 
where i=environmental benchmark, j=herbicide, and k=tillage practice. Exposure values 
larger than 1 indicate that the predicted concentration exceeds the environmental benchmark, 
while exposure values less than 1 indicate predicted concentrations less than the 
environmental benchmark. To compare the relative long-term health risks of herbicides, we 
divide predicted average groundwater concentrations by the EPA's lifetime health advisory-
level (HAL) for each herbicide. We denote the resulting exposure value as chronic exposure. 
To compare the relative short-term health risks, we divide predicted peak groundwater or 
surface water concentrations by the EPA's 10-day health advisory level for each herbicide. 
We denote the resulting exposure value as acute exposure. To compare the aquatic habitat 
risks, we divide predicted peak surface water concentrations by the EPA's aquatic benchmark. 
The resulting exposure value is denoted as acute aquatic exposure. 
For this analysis we only consider tax policies based on the chronic exposure value. 
This focuses our efforts toward reducing herbicide health risks in groundwater. This was 
chosen as a priority for our analysis since pesticide contamination of groundwater is a 
significant concern in Iowa. In a survey of private rural water wells in Iowa, Kress et al. 
(1992) found that pesticides were detected in approximately 14% of the wells surveyed, with 
1.2% of the wells having concentrations exceeding the lifetime HAL. The majority of the 
wells were thought to be contaminated by nonpoint sources related to normal agricultural 
practices. 
These policies were chosen first to show how tax policies compare to herbicide bans, 
and second to show what level of herbicide tax targeting is most beneficial. Unlike previous 
studies which have focused on geographical targeting (see for example Braden et al. 1989 and 
Mapp et al. 1994), our analysis targets characteristics of specific herbicides. The tax policies 
we consider show incremental increases in the level of herbicide targeting, with the Flat tax 
being the least targeted tax. The HAL and Aquatic tax show an increase in herbicide targeting 
over the flat tax since they incorporate information about the relative risks individual 
herbicides pose once they reach water supplies. The exposure tax shows an increase in 
herbicide targeting over the HAL tax and Aquatic tax since it includes information about the 
likelihood of individual herbicides reaching water supplies as well as the risks these herbicides 
pose once they reach water supplies. Finally, the tillage-exposure tax shows an increase in 
herbicide targeting over the exposure tax since it includes information about the tillage 
practice used in addition to the information required for the exposure tax. 
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For each set of tax policies, tax rates are set for atrazine under conventional tillage at 
$1.00, $5.00, $10.00, and $15.00 per pound active ingredient (a.i.)'. For the flat tax these 
rates are levied on all herbicides. For the HAL and aquatic taxes the tax rates for each 
herbicide are proportional to the atrazine tax rate based on the benchmark for that herbicide: 
(atrazine benchmarkj) x (atrazine tax ratej) 
taxrate.j = ^ (3) 
benchmarkij 
where i=environmental benchmark, j=herbicide. For example, if the HAL tax rate for atrazine 
is $5.00 per pound active ingredient, the corresponding HAL tax rate for alachlor would be 
(3)($5.00)/2 = $7.50 per pound active ingredient. Similarly, if the aquatic tax rate for atrazine 
is $5.00 per pound active ingredient, the corresponding aquatic tax rate for alachlor would be 
(2)($5.00)/l = $10.00 per pound active ingredient. 
For the chronic exposure tax the tax rates for each herbicide are proportional to the 
atrazine rate based on the predicted 1.2M groundwater chronic exposure for that herbicide: 
(predicted exposure.j) x (atrazine exposure tax ratei) , 
exposure tax rate,, = — —^ (4) 
atrazine groundwater predicted exposure. 
where i=environmental benchmark (in this case, lifetime HAL), j=herbicide and the predicted 
exposure values are calculated as in equation (1). Similarly, the chronic tillage-exposure tax 
rates for each herbicide are proportional to the conventional tillage atrazine rate based on the 
predicted 1.2M groundwater chronic exposure for that herbicide and tillage combination: 
' The $15.00 per pound active ingredient tax for atrazine was chosen as an upper bound since 
it produced changes in either on-farm net returns or predicted groundwater exposure levels 
comparable to a triazine ban for most tax policies. The other levels were chosen as 
intermediate points between the baseline and the $15.00 per pound tax. 
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• • _ (predicted exposureijk) X (atrazine cv.till. exposure tax rate.) 
e x p o s u r e  t a x  r E t e i j i c  —  — — — — — — _ — ^ 5 )  
atrazine groundwater predicted exposurcik 
where i=environmental benchmark (in this case, lifetime HAL), j=herbicide, and k=tillage 
practice. 
Table 2 shows the $1.00 per pound atrazine tax rate schedules for the HAL weighted 
tax policy, the aquatic benchmark weighted tax policy, and the two exposure weighted tax 
policies. Separate exposure weighted tax rates are calculated for atrazine applied at a rate 
greater than 1,5 pounds active ingredient and atrazine applied at a rate less than 1.5 pounds 
active ingredient based on baseline use. The aquatic benchmark tax does not include a $15,00 
per pound a.i. tax since the $10,00 per pound tax resulted in a larger decrease in on-farm net 
returns than any other policy. 
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Table 2. Tax rates per pound active ingredient based on a $1.00 per pound atrazine 
conventional till atrazine tax 
Environmental 
Benchmark Taxes Exposure Taxes 
Conv. Till Red. Till No Till 
Lifetime Aquatic Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure 
HAL tax tax $/lb tax $/lb tax $/lb tax $/lb tax $/lb 
Chemical S/lb a.i. a.i. a.i. a.i. a.i. a.i. 
Atrazine >1.5 lb a. i. $1.00 $1.00 $1,000 $1,000 $2,483 $2,210 
Atrazine < 1.5 lb a. i. $1.00 $1.00 $0,936 $1,385 $2,556 $5,584 
Nicosulfuron $0.07 $66.67 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 
Dicamba $0.33 $2.00 $0,005 $0,007 $0,012 $0,015 
Cyanazine $0,33 $1.00 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 
Bromoxynil $0.02 $2.00 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 
Bentazon $0.15 $2.00 $0,120 $0,266 $0,481 $0,605 
Metolachlor $0.03 $2.00 $0,000 $0,001 $0,000 $0,000 
EPTC $0.02 $2.00 $0,000 SO.OOO $0,000 $0,000 
Alachlor $1.50 $2.00 $0,000 $0,000 $0,001 $0,001 
Simazine $0.09 $0.00 $0,030 $0,066 $0,122 $0,109 
Pendimethalin $0.01 $2.00 $0,013 $13,147 $0,000 $0,000 
Propachlor $0.04 $2.00 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 
Glyphosate $0.00 $0.03 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 
Butylate $0.06 $2.00 $0,000 $0,001 $0,000 $0,000 
2,4-D $0.04 $2.S3 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 $0,000 
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3. MODELING SYSTEM 
The CEEPES (Comprehensive Environmental Economic Policy Evaluation System) 
model, was used to evaluate the effects of alternative policies. CEEPES is an integrated 
system of models designed to evaluate the risks and benefits of alternative policy scenarios 
(Bouzaher et al., 1994) for a detailed description of the CEEPES system. Under the 
configuration of CEEPES used for analysis of herbicides policies aimed at reducing non-point 
source pollution, the effectiveness of alternative weed control strategies are modeled using 
WISH (Weather Impact Simulator for Herbicides). Figure 1 shows the information flow in 
CEEPES. 
WISH simulates the cost and effectiveness of 488 weed control strategies for corn and 
148 weed control strategies for sorghum using 50 years of daily weather information. Each 
weed control strategy is composed of a primary strategy that is used if weather conditions 
permit and a secondary strategy that is used if the primary strategy cannot be used or fails. 
Each strategy is differentiated according to different timings and lengths of application and 
effectiveness 'windows of opportunity', different associated tillage practices, and different soil 
types (sand or clay) (see Bouzaher et al. 1992 for a detailed description of the WISH model). 
The use of the WISH model allows us to consider a rich set of herbicide substitution 
possibilities using a combination of expert opinion and physical simulation. This is a 
significant improvement over previous policy analyses which have used only limited 
substitution or relied entirely on surveys or expert opinion (see for example Taylor and 
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Figure 1. Information flow in CEEPES 
Frohberg 1977, Knutson et al. 1990, Kania and Johnson 1981, Swinton 1991, Cox and Easter 
1990, Burton and Martin 1987, and Smith et al. 1990). 
The effectiveness of each weed control strategy from WISH is converted to a crop 
yield using ALMANAC (Agricukural Land Management Alternatives with Numerical 
Assessment Criteria). ALMANAC simulates the effect of weed competition and interactions 
of management alternatives on weed growth (Jones et al. 1986, Kiniry et al. 1991). 
The costs and yields for each weed control strategy are then used as input coefficients 
for the weed control activities in RAMS (Resource Adjustment Modeling System). RAMS is 
a linear-programming model that chooses the profit-maximizing mix of crop production 
activities for a representative producer at the producing area (PA) level. There are 105 
producing areas in the United States. This analysis focuses on the effects of alternative 
policies in a single PA (PA41), covering most of Iowa and a few counties from neighboring 
states. 
The output of RAMS is linked to the fate and transport models RUSTIC (Risk of the 
Unsaturated/Saturated Transport and Transportation of Chemical Concentrations) and 
STREAM (Surface Transport and Agricultural Runoff of Pesticides for Exposure 
Assessment) (Dean et al. 1989, Donigian et al. 1986). These models respectively estimate 
groundwater and surface water concentrations of herbicides. For groundwater, peak and 
average concentrations are estimated at depths of 1.2 meters and 15 meters. For surface 
water, only a peak concentration is estimated. 
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The CEEPES model links WISH and ALMANAC, and RAMS, RUSTIC and 
STREAM by using metamodel response functions (Bouzaher et al. 1993). Metamodels are 
regression models explaining the input-output relationships of simulation models. 
Metamodeling allows us to evaluate several alternatives without running each of the 
simulation models for each alternative. Without this feature the number of alternatives we 
could compare would be quite limited due to the time required to run each of the simulation 
models. This feature allows us to consider several different policies and multiple levels of tax 
rates. 
The effects of ahernative policy scenarios are measured in terms of changes in 
producer net returns (on-farm costs), and changes in groundwater and surface water exposure 
values. We also examine the effects of alternative policies on total pounds of herbicide 
applied and average application rates. 
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4. ANALYSIS 
We present the resuhs in four stages —^first, we consider the economic indicators of 
changes in net returns and crop yields for each policy, second, for each policy we construct 
the tradeoff frontiers between economic and environmental indicators of total herbicide use, 
total atrazine use, application rates, and exposure levels. Third, we explore the tradeoffs 
between surface and groundwater exposures for each policy. Finally, we develop a tradeoff 
frontier and "best" policy set based on a uniform weighting of each environmental indicator. 
4.1 Economic Indicators 
Table 3 shows the change in producer net returns for each scenario compared to the 
baseline. The $10.00 aquatic benchmark tax produced the largest reduction in net returns: 
$190 million from the baseline or $8.03 per crop acre. This represents a 4.22% decrease in 
net returns from the baseline. Table 4 shows changes in corn and sorghum yields for each 
policy. Corn yield changes were generally small, with the maximum yield change of 2.7% 
occurring under the $10.00 aquatic benchmark tax. Yield changes were more significant for 
sorghum with a 29.3% decrease for a triazine ban. These yield decreases show how the 
alternative policies affect weed control decisions. Policies that result in larger yield changes 
are forcing changes toward weed control practices which are less expensive but are more 
likely to result in weed control failures, while policies that result in smaller yield changes 
produce substitutions to weed control practices that are more expensive but maintain levels of 
weed control. 
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Table 3. Change in net returns for each policy 
Decrease 
from Per Acre 
Baseline Decrease from % Change 
Scenario (million $) Baseline from Baseline 
Atrazine Ban 9.7 $0.41 0.21% 
Triazine Ban 73.8 $3.11 1.64% 
$1.00/lb Flat tax 15.1 $0.64 0.34% 
$5.00/lb Flat tax 75.2 $3.17 1.67% 
$10.00/lb Flat tax 135.2 $5.71 3.00% 
$15.00/lb Flat tax 180.0 $7.60 4.00% 
$1.00/lb HAL tax 7.7 $0.33 0.17% 
$5.00/lb HAL tax 33.7 $1.42 0.75% 
$10.00/lb HAL tax 57.6 $2.43 1.28% 
$15.00/lb HAL tax 81.6 $3.45 1.81% 
$1.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 25.4 $1.07 0.56% 
$5.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 107.3 $4.53 2.38% 
$10.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 190.2 $8.03 4.22% 
$1.00/lb Exp. tax 3.6 $0.15 0.08% 
$5.00/lb Exp. tax 9.1 $0.38 0.20% 
$10.00/lb Exp. tax 9.7 $0.41 0.22% 
$15.00/lb Exp. tax 9.8 $0.41 0.22% 
$1.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 7.2 $0.31 0.16% 
$5.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 9.9 $0.42 0.22% 
$10.00/ib Till-Exp. tax 10.2 $0.43 0.23% 
$15.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 10.4 $0.44 0.23% 
The effects of alternative policies on production decisions will tend to be exaggerated 
in this model, since crop prices and herbicide prices are held constant in the RAMS model. 
This is a reasonable assumption for regional policies, although we would need to include 
market effects for national policies. Also, an upper bound is placed on soybean acreage at 
125% of the 1992 actual level to calibrate the model to current conditions. To avoid biasing 
103 
Table 4. Change in crop yields for each policy 
Scenario 
% Change in 
Com Grain 
Yield 
% Change in 
Com Silage 
Yield 
% Change in 
Sorghum 
Grain Yield 
Atrazine Ban -0.1% 0.0% -9.1% 
Triazine Ban -1.4% -0.9% -29.3% 
$1.00/lb Flat tax 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$5.00/lb Flat tax -0.2% -0.2% -10.6% 
$10.00/lb Flat tax -1.7% -0.4% -10.6% 
$15.00/lb Flat tax -2.0% -0.4% -10.6% 
$1.00/lb HAL tax 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$5.00/lb HAL tax -0.1% 0.0% -10.6% 
$10.00/lb HAL tax -0.1% 0.0% -10.6% 
$15.00/lb HAL tax -0.1% 0.0% -10.6% 
$1.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 
$5.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 0.7% -0.1% -2.3% 
$10.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax -2.7% 0.3% -2.3% 
$1.00/lb Exp. tax 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
$5.00/lb Exp. tax -0.1% 0.0% -13.7% 
$10.00/lb Exp. tax 0.0% 0.0% -13.7% 
$15.00/lb Exp. tax 0.0% 0.0% -13.7% 
$1.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.0% 0.0% -0.3% 
S5.00/lb Till-Exp. tax -0.1% 0.0% -0.3% 
$ 10.00/lb Till-Exp. tax -0.1% 0.0% -8.6% 
$15.00/lb Till-Exp. tax -0.1% 0.0% -8.6% 
the outcomes, this upper bound was left in place for all policies. The constraint was binding 
for all policies. As a result there could be no substitution from corn to soybeans as taxes 
increased. There were no constraints on substitutions to other crops, however crop acreage 
did not change from the baseline for any of the policies modeled. 
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4.2 Tradeoffs Between Economic and Environmental Indicators 
Analyzing the results for several different tax levels allows us to construct a policy 
frontier showing the tradeoffs achievable with each policy tool. These frontiers can then be 
combined to form an overall efficient frontier of available policies, showing the tradeoffs 
achievable with this set of tools. These frontiers are similar to Xu et al. (1995) who 
constructed noninferior solution frontiers among net returns, soil erosion, and nitrate leaching. 
However there is one key difference. Their analysis showed the frontier set of solutions that 
could be achieved given current production technology. They did not indicate the policies 
that could be used to reach this frontier. Our approach generates a frontier of solutions that 
could be achieved given the current production technology and given a set of policy 
instruments. Furthermore, we are able to indicate which policy instruments are used to reach 
points on the frontier. 
Table 5 lists changes in total pounds of herbicides applied and average application 
rates for all herbicides together and for atrazine only. Negative values imply that pounds 
applied or application rates actually increase. Figures 2 and 3 show the tradeoff frontiers 
between a decrease in net returns and a decrease in total pounds of herbicide applied for each 
set of policies. These figures show the effects of alternative policies in reducing the amount of 
herbicides that are applied to the region as a whole. Looking at Figure 2, we see that flat 
taxes and bans are the only policies that produce significant reductions in total pounds of 
herbicide applied. This is expected for a flat tax since it makes all herbicide use more 
expensive. For the bans this means that eliminating atrazine or all triazines leads either to use 
105 
Table 5. Decrease in pounds applied and average application rates for each policy 
All Herbicides Atrazine 
Decrease in Decrease in 
Decrease in Average Decrease in Average 
Pounds Application Pounds Application 
Scenario Applied Rate Applied Rate 
Atrazine Ban -0.15% -11.78% 100.00% 100.00% 
Triazine Ban 7,19% -9.88% 100.00% 100.00% 
$1.00/lb Flat tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$5.00/lb Flat tax 2.36% -3.32% 1.16% -2.57% 
$10.00/lb Flat tax 39.51% 11.85% 71.90% -48.00% 
$15.00/lb Flat tax 47.14% 20.47% 89.03% -130.72% 
Sl.OO/lb HAL tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$5.00/lb HAL tax -9.70% -27.24% 89.97% -130.12% 
$10.00/lb HAL tax -9.70% -27.24% 89.97% -130.12% 
$15.00/lb HAL tax -9.70% -27.24% 89.97% -130.12% 
$1.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 0.37% -3.96% -0.32% -0.01% 
$5,00/lb Aqua. Bench tax -6.42% -24.88% 29.94% 2.34% 
SlO.OO/lb Aqua. Bench tax -2.52% -26.88% 51.22% -0.48% 
$1.00/lb Exp. tax 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
$5.00/lb Exp. tax 0.74% -13.61% 92.17% -120.92% 
$10.00/lb Exp. tax -0.16% -11.68% 99.90% 45.57% 
$15.00/lb Exp. tax -0.16% -11.68% 99.90% 45.57% 
$1.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.00% -9.82% 53.79% -23.06% 
$5.00/lb Till-Exp. tax -0.24% -11.85% 99.62% -106.34% 
$10.00/lb Till-Exp. tax -0.15% -11.74% 99.99% 96.96% 
$15.00/lb Till-Exp. tax -0.15% -11.74% 99.99% 96.96% 
of herbicides with lower application rates, or reductions in the number of acres treated. The 
exposure tax and the tillage-exposure tax policies, denoted by 'Exposure' and 'TExposure' in 
the legend, produce little change in the amount of herbicide applied, implying any changes in 
application rates are offset by changes in the number of acres treated. The HAL tax and the 
aquatic benchmark tax policies lead to increases in total herbicide use, implying producers 
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either substitute toward herbicides which require higher application rates to be effective, or to 
herbicides which require more rescue applications. 
Figure 3 shows that atrazine use decreases in all of the sets of policies. Even though 
atrazine is not always the most highly taxed herbicide per pound of application, it does 
become relatively more expensive than some herbicides. Figure 3 shows that more 
substitutions are made away from atrazine toward relatively less expensive herbicides than 
from relatively more expensive herbicides toward atrazine. The two exposure tax policies and 
the set of bans are able to achieve reductions in atrazine use at the lowest on-farm cost. This 
is expected since these policies are focused more narrowly on reducing the use of atrazine. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the tradeoff frontiers between a decrease in net returns and a 
decrease in average herbicide application rates. These figures show the effectiveness of 
alternative policy tools in reducing the intensity of herbicide use. Figure 4 shows that only a 
flat tax is effective in reducing average application rates of all corn and sorghum herbicides. 
All other policies lead to substitutions toward herbicides with higher application rates. 
Although this is somewhat discouraging, it is not entirely surprising. Other than the flat tax, 
the tax policies we consider change the relative prices of herbicides per pound active 
ingredient. These changes in relative prices may make herbicides that tend to be applied at 
low application rates relatively more expensive than herbicides that tend to be applied at high 
application rates. This would increase the overall average application rate for the region. 
Figure 5 shows that only the bans and the exposure tax policies are effective at 
reducing atrazine application rates. Furthermore the exposure tax policies are only effective at 
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reducing atrazine application rates if the tax is set high enough. However, Figure 3 showed 
that all of the policies reduced total pounds of atrazine applied. This indicates that most 
policies result in a decrease in the number of acres treated by atrazine, and that the acres no 
longer treated by atrazine were receiving low average application rates in the baseline. This 
indicates that most policies result in a reduced use of atrazine as a rescue treatment, but 
maintain the use of atrazine as a primary weed control strategy. When atrazine becomes 
relatively more heavily taxed, as in the higher exposure tax policies, we begin to see a 
reduction in the use of atrazine as a primary weed control strategy reducing both the acres 
treated by atrazine and atrazine average application rates. 
Policies which decrease total pounds of herbicide applied and/or herbicide application 
rates might be expected to increase water quality. However these measures do not take into 
consideration differences in the risks individual herbicides pose once they reach water 
supplies. Also they do not take into consideration how likely each herbicide is to reach water 
supplies. We use the EPA benchmarks to account for the differences in risks individual 
herbicides pose once they reach water supplies. The metamodels for RUSTIC and STREAM 
are used to predict the transport of herbicides to water supplies. Table 6 lists changes in 
weighted groundwater and surface water exposure levels for each policy. These values 
represent a weighted sum of herbicide chronic groundwater exposure values across herbicide, 
tillage and crop, weighted according to the number of acres treated by each herbicide for each 
crop and tillage practice: 
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Table 6. Decreases in groundwater and surface water weighted sum exposure values 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
(F) 
Decrease 
Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease Decrease in Stream 
in 1.2M in 1.2M in 15M in 15M in Stream Acute 
Chronic Acute Chronic Acute Acute Aquatic 
Scenario Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure Exposure 
A.trazine Ban 0.0835 0.0268 4.83E-04 1.48E-04 0.1619 1.7880 
Triazine Ban 0.0835 0.0242 4.86E-04 1.66E-04 1.2583 -36.0989 
$1.00/lb Flat tax 0.0016 0.0035 1.98E-05 1.89E-05 -0.1331 -12.0135 
$5.00/lb Flat tax 0.0028 0.0039 7.11E-05 2.86E-05 -0.1257 -6.1468 
$10.00/ib Flat tax 0.0648 0.0220 3.74E-04 1.34E-04 1.3083 58.4604 
$15.00/lb Flat tax 0.0740 0.0253 4.19E-04 1.50E-04 1.4054 55.8361 
$1.00/lb HAL tax 0.0016 0.0035 1.98E-05 1.89E-05 -0.1331 -12.0135 
$5.00/lb HAL tax 0.0721 0.0107 3.99E-04 -4.00E-06 -0.2351 24.0890 
$10.00/lb HAL tax 0.0721 0.0107 3.99E-04 -4.00E-06 -0.2351 24.0890 
$15.00/lb HAL tax 0.0721 0.0107 3.99E-04 -4.00E-06 -0.2351 24.0890 
$1.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax -0.0006 -0.0008 -3.10E-06 -1.52E-06 -0.0128 -0.7714 
$5.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 0.0145 -0.0238 1.08E-04 -1.28E-04 -0.7885 6.9543 
$10.00/lb Aqua, Bench tax 0.0331 -0.0235 2.04E-04 -1.22E-04 -0.6401 19.1591 
$1.00/lb Exp. tax 0.0016 0.0035 1.98E-05 1.89E-05 -0.1331 -12.0135 
$5,00/lb Exp. tax 0.0759 0.0265 4.32E-04 1.54E-04 0.2487 12.4273 
SlO.OO/lb Exp. tax 0.0825 0.0267 4.76E-04 1.47E-04 0.1615 1.8597 
$15.00/lb Exp. tax 0.0825 0.0267 4.76E-04 1.47E-04 0.1615 1.8597 
$1.00/lb Till-E.xp. tax 0.0554 0.0192 2.86E-04 1.12E-04 0.1682 3.0461 
$5.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.0831 0.0268 4.39E-04 1.45E-04 0.1595 1.7164 
SlO.OO/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.0835 0.0268 4.82E-04 1.48E-04 0.1618 1,7849 
$15.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.0835 0.0268 4.82E-04 1.48E-04 0.1618 1.7849 
. , , , , (exposure valueWacres)t;k 
weighted groundwater exposure value = > (6) 
^ total com and sorghum acres 
where i=crop, j=tiliage practice, and k=herbicide. By calculating a weighted sum for these 
exposures we are loolcing at region-wide water quality measures. 
Figure 6 shows the tradeoff frontiers between a decrease in net returns and a decrease 
in weighted 1,2 meter chronic groundwater exposures (column A in table 6). This figure 
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shows that all of the policies are effective at decreasing 1.2 meter chronic exposure values. 
The two sets of exposure tax policies and the set of bans achieve reductions at the lowest on-
farm cost. It is expected that the two exposure policies achieve the reductions efficiently, 
since these policies are targeted specifically at reducing 1.2 meter chronic exposure. It is 
somewhat surprising that banning atrazine is also an efficient means of reducing 1.2 meter 
chronic exposure from all herbicides, since this policy targets atrazine only. This indicates 
how significant a contributor atrazine is to the overall exposure values. The atrazine ban is 
equally as effective as high exposure weighted taxes at making large reductions in 1.2 meter 
chronic exposure levels. If the goal is a smaller reduction at a smaller cost, the exposure taxes 
are most efficient achieving 0% to nearly 100% reductions in 1.2 meter chronic exposure 
levels at the lowest costs. There appears to be no significant advantage to targeting herbicide 
applications by tillage practice than targeting individual herbicides without regard to tillage, 
even though the RUSTIC and STREAM metamodels indicate that herbicide fate and transport 
differs significantly for different tillage practices (Bouzaher et al. 1993). This indicates that 
even though different tillage practices can affect the fate and transport of herbicides, the 
characteristics of the individual herbicides themselves are more important in determining 
groundwater and surface water exposure values. 
4.3 TradeotYs Among Environmental Indicators 
To this point we have considered tradeoffs between net returns and one single physical 
effect. We now consider the tradeoffs between pairs of the physical effects. This helps us to 
see that individual policies have several simultaneous physical effects as well as an economic 
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effect, and that choosing among policies also involves understanding tradeoffs among physical 
effects. Figure 7 shows the tradeoffs between a decrease in the weighted sum acute stream 
aquatic exposure (column F in table 6) and a decrease in the weighted sum 1.2 meter chronic 
exposure. This shows tradeoffs between drinking water risks and aquatic habitat risks. In this 
figure, policies in quadrant I are improvements in both 1.2 meter groundwater quality and 
aquatic surface water quality (win-win policies). Policies in quadrants II and IV are mixed 
effects with an improvement in one water quality indicator and a decline in the other water 
quality indicator (win-lose policies). Policies in quadrant III are a decline in both water 
quality indicators (lose-lose policies). All policies except the tillage specific exposure taxes at 
some point increase acute aquatic exposure values, however all of the tax policies do reduce 
acute aquatic exposures as tax rates increase. So, targeting individual herbicides becomes less 
important as tax rates increase. An atrazine ban decreases acute aquatic exposure slightly, but 
going to a triazine ban increases acute aquatic exposure over 20% above the baseline level. 
The $10.00 per pound and $15.00 flat taxes produce the largest decrease in acute aquatic 
exposures and simultaneously decrease 1.2 meter chronic exposure by 70-90% from the 
baseline. The aquatic tax policies show a trend of decreasing both acute aquatic exposure and 
1.2 meter chronic exposure, however greater reductions are seen from the flat tax with a 
smaller decrease in net returns, so the flat tax achieves the reductions more efficiently even 
though the aquatic tax is targeted at reducing aquatic habitat risk. 
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Figure 8 shows the tradeoffs between a decrease in stream acute exposure (column E 
in table 6) and a decrease in 1.2 meter chronic exposure. This shows tradeoffs among 
groundwater and surface water drinking water exposures. Similar to the acute aquatic 
exposure, all of the tax policies except the tillage-exposure taxes initially increase stream acute 
exposure. The ban policies produce decreases in both the stream acute exposure and the 1.2 
meter chronic exposure. Also similar to the acute aquatic exposure, the $10.00 per pound and 
$15.00 per pound flat taxes produce the greatest decrease in stream acute exposure. 
However the triazine ban results in nearly as large a decrease in stream drinking water 
exposure while reducing 1.2 meter chronic exposure by nearly 100% and producing a smaller 
decrease in net returns. All of the aquatic taxes and HAL weighted taxes increase stream 
acute exposures. Recall that these policies target individual herbicides based on the risks they 
present when they reach surface waters. Since these policies do not account for the likelihood 
of individual herbicides reaching surface waters they are not effective at reducing stream acute 
exposures. 
4.4 Choosing 'Best Available' Policies 
To choose a set of'best available' policies from the taxes and bans we combine the 
exposure values into one measure. This allows us to construct an single efficient tradeoff 
frontier between on-farm costs and water quality. To combine the exposure values to one 
measure we need to know the relative importance of each individual exposure value. Ideally 
the relative weights should be set taking into consideration social preferences and the relative 
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Figure 8. Tradeoffs between decreased acute stream drinking water exposure and decreased 1.2M chronic exposure 
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damages implied by each exposure measure. To our knowledge no empirical evidence exists 
for determining the relative weights to place groundwater, surface water, and aquatic habitat 
water quality measures. 
Lacking an empirical basis for setting relative water quality weights, we illustrate how 
an efficient policy tool would be chosen giving equal weighting to proportional reductions in 
1.2 meter chronic exposure, acute stream exposure, and acute aquatic exposure. An overall 
exposure index is calculated by dividing the 1.2 meter chronic exposure value, the acute 
stream exposure value, and the acute aquatic exposure value for each policy by the 
corresponding baseline exposures. The single overall exposure index is the average of these 
three values. Using this index, a 10% reduction in 1.2 meter chronic exposure is equally as 
important as a 10% reduction in acute aquatic exposure. 
Table 7 shows the overall exposure index for each policy. Index values greater than 
one indicate a decrease in overall water quality compared to the baseline, while index values 
less than one indicate an improvement in overall water quality compared to the baseline. 
Figure 9 shows the tradeoffs between producer net returns and the exposure index. 
An overall efficient tradeoff frontier would include points that are below and to the right of 
the other points. This would include the $1.00 per pound a.i. and $5.00 per pound a.i. 
exposure tax policies, the $1.00 per pound a.i. tillage-exposure tax, the triazine ban and the 
$10.00 per pound a.i. and $15.00 per pound a.i. flat taxes. The rest of the exposure and 
tillage-exposure taxes and the atrazine ban are just off of the efficient frontier. 
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Table 7. Overall exposure index for each policy 
Overall 
Exposure 
Scenario Index 
Baseline 1 
Atrazine Ban 0.63976 
Triazine Ban 0.54211 
$l,00/lb Flat tax 1.03831 
$5.00/lb Flat tax 1.02087 
$10.00/lb Flat tax 0.42213 
$15.00/lb Flat tax 0.3755 
$1.00/lb HAL tax 1.03831 
$5.00/lb HAL tax 0.7033 
$10.00/lb HAL tax 0.7033 
$15.00/lb HAL tax 0.7033 
Sl.OO/lb Aqua. Bench tax 1.006 
$5.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 1.0527 
$10.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax 0.93139 
$1.00/lb Exp. tax 1.03831 
$5.00/lb Exp. tax 0.63528 
$10.00/lb Exp. tax 0.64376 
$15.00/lb Exp. tax 0.64376 
$1.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.74758 
$5.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.6419 
$10.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.6398 
$15.00/lb Till-Exp. tax 0.6398 
In general, we cannot choose a single overall efficient policy. Instead we have an 
efficient policy set. Different policies are most efficient for achieving different levels of water 
quality improvement. This supports the assertion of Malik et al. 1992 that no single policy is 
likely to be effective in reducing all nonpoint source pollution. The exposure and tillage-
exposure tax policies are most efficient at achieving 0%-37% reductions in the exposure 
index. The bans are most efficient at achieving 35%-46% reduction in the exposure index. 
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Figure 9, TradeotYs between decreased profit and decreased overall exposure index 
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and flat taxes are most efficient at achieving up to 62% reductions in the exposure index. It 
appears that modeling exposure is useful for developing tax policies if the goal is to fine tune 
water quality improvements. However, if larger improvements are desired the added 
information is not necessary, and bans or flat taxes should be used. Using this information, a 
policy maker can determine the on-farm costs for achieving different levels of water quality 
improvement, and which policy tools can be used to achieve these improvements. 
Finally, one benefit of tax policies is that the tax revenue raised can be used to offset 
some of the costs of administering the policies. Table 8 shows the tax revenues raised by each 
policy. The tax revenues are also expressed as a percentage of the decrease in net returns that 
occurs as a result of the policy. This shows the portion of the on-farm cost of each policy that 
is directly attributable to the tax. The remainder of the cost is incurred indirectly through 
changes in production practices. It is interesting to note that the on-farm costs of the 
exposure weighted tax policies are largely due to changes in production practices. As these 
targeted taxes increase, tax revenues decrease dramatically as a percentage of the change in 
net returns. These taxes cause producers make substitutions toward herbicides that are not 
taxed. Producers would rather absorb the yield losses than pay the tax, since the marginal 
cost of the yield loss is less than the marginal cost of the tax. Alternatively, the flat taxes, 
HAL taxes, and aquatic taxes apparently do not induce such substitutions. These taxes are 
too broad-based. Producers cannot avoid the taxes without reducing overall herbicide use. It 
takes a bigger stick to induce substitutions away from herbicide use to mechanical weed 
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Table 8. Tax revenues raised by each policy 
%of 
Decrease in 
Net 
Scenario Total Tax Returns 
$I.OO/lb Flat tax $15,132,503 100% 
$5.00/lb Flat tax $73,874,574 98% 
$10.00/tb Flat tax $91,535,846 68% 
$15.00/lb Flat tax $119,993,443 67% 
$1.00/lb HAL tax $7,744,269 100% 
$5.00/lb HAL tax $23,989,153 71% 
SlO.OO/lb HAL tax $47,978,306 83% 
$15.00/lb HAL tax $71,967,458 88% 
$1,00/lb Aqua. Bench tax $25,353,897 100% 
$5.00/lb Aqua. Bench tax $86,742,784 81% 
SlO.OO/lb Aqua. Bench tax $160,413,158 84% 
Sl .OO/lb Exp, tax $3,589,027 100% 
$5.00/lb Exp. tax $1,530,955 17% 
$10.00/lb Exp. tax $197,976 2% 
$15.00/lb Exp. tax $296,964 3% 
$1.00/ib Till-Exp. tax $2,696,407 37% 
S5.00/lb Till-E.xp. tax $344,820 4% 
$10.00/lb Till-Exp. tax $490,829 5% 
$15.00/lb Till-Exp. tax $736,244 7% 
control than substitutions to alternative herbicides. The exposure weighted taxes are eftective 
because they make the specific herbicides that are likely to cause environmental damage 
relatively more expensive than the herbicides that are less likely to cause environmental 
damage. Producers can largely avoid the tax by substituting to the less damaging herbicides. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Using the CEEPES model we compare the economic and environmental tradeoffs for 
several alternative tax policies and herbicide bans. Our results indicate that using more 
information about individual herbicides can be useful for forming tax policies to reduce 
nonpoint source pollution. We found that tax policies that use predicted groundwater 
exposure levels to target specific herbicides and herbicide-tillage practices are an effective and 
cost-efficient tool for reducing predicted groundwater exposure. However, there does not 
appear to be any significant advantage to targeting herbicide-tillage practice combinations 
over targeting individual herbicides alone. The effects of individual herbicides on 
groundwater quality are much more important than the effects of tillage practices. We also 
found that environmental benchmarks alone are not usefijl for constructing nonpoint pollution 
tax policies. 
No single policy tool was most efficient for reducing groundwater exposure, surface 
water acute exposure, and surface water aquatic exposure. Using an equal weight on 
decreases in 1.2 meter groundwater chronic exposure, surface water acute exposure, and 
surface water aquatic exposure we constructed an efficient policy set. By constructing an 
efficient policy set we not only show the tradeoffs that are achievable, but also the policies 
that can be used to achieve specific exposure levels. Our results indicate that exposure tax 
policies were most cost-efficient for achieving small percentage reductions in overall 
exposure, bans were most cost-efficient for achieving moderate percentage reductions in 
overall exposure, and flat taxes were most cost-efficient for achieving high percentage 
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reductions in overall exposure. So, for large percentage changes in exposure levels, crude 
tools like bans or flat taxes are all that is necessary, however information about predicted 
exposures is useful for efficiently achieving small percentage changes in exposure levels. 
There are several possible extensions to our work that may be useful for future policy 
analysis. First, our results for combined surface water and groundwater effects are subject to 
change depending on the relative weights placed on changes in groundwater and surface water 
exposure values. Future research should focus on developing weighting schemes based on 
social or policy preferences. Second, our framework allows for the comparison of any 
number of nonpoint pollution policies. Some policies that could be added to our analysis 
include targeting based on measures of surface water quality and targeting based on 
geographical characteristics. Finally, our analysis was limited to corn and sorghum weed 
control decisions only since these were the first crops modeled in WISH. As more crops are 
added to the WISH model, our approach could be expanded to include all herbicide use in the 
region. 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
Together, these three papers have considered the effects of uncertainty and nonpoint 
pollution policy on herbicide decisions at several different levels. We have looked at tradeoffs 
between herbicide use and the use of fertilizer, tradeoffs between the types and quantities of 
herbicides used, and tradeoffs between net returns and water quality. 
Our results from the first paper reflect the use of herbicides and their relationship to 
the use of productive inputs. Generally, we show that if a producer faces higher probability of 
loss he or she will apply less herbicide and less fertilizer. We also show that increased 
probability of loss leads producers to apply less persistent types of herbicides and less 
fertilizer. Consequently, producers who face a higher risk of loss, due to regional climatic 
characteristics or to the level of technology they have available, should be expected to 
contribute less to nonpoint source pollution than producers who face a lower risk of loss. 
Also, our results indicate that both herbicide quantities and fertilizer quantities are stochastic 
complements and that herbicide persistence and fertilizer quantities are stochastic 
complements. Policies aimed at restricting fertilizer quantities will indirectly tend to reduce 
herbicide quantities and herbicide persistence, while policies aimed at restricting either 
herbicide quantities or persistence will tend to reduce fertilizer quantities. In each case the 
policy is more effective at reducing nonpoint pollution than its direct effect would indicate. 
Looking at inter-input substitution only, one might conclude that these types of policies 
represent an effective means of reducing nonpoint source pollution. However, this paper does 
not consider the effect of nonpoint pollution policy on substitution between herbicide types 
and herbicide quantities (intra-input substitution). These substitutions were modeled in the 
third paper. 
Our results from the second paper indicate that herbicide quantities and herbicide 
persistence are stochastic substitutes, so policies aimed at reducing nonpoint pollution by 
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restricting one likely increases the other, possibly leading to more serious nonpoint pollution 
problems. This clearly illustrates the importance of modeling all possible types of 
substitutions in policy analysis. An analysis that ignores intra-input substitution would 
overestimate the effectiveness of restriction policies in reducing nonpoint source pollution, 
while an analysis that ignores inter-input substitution would underestimate the effectiveness of 
such policies. In fact, the error may be so large that the first analysis would show a net 
decrease in nonpoint source pollution while the second would show a net increase in nonpoint 
source pollution! 
Our results from the second paper also reflect the joint use of herbicide quantities and 
types in dealing with uncertainty. Generally we show that risk and uncertainty lead to a 
tradeoff between herbicide rates and herbicide persistence. However, the exact effect depends 
on the source of risk. An increase in the probability of loss leaving the efficacy of self-
protection unchanged decreases herbicide application rates and leads to use of more persistent 
herbicides. Alternatively, an increase in the probability of loss that reduces the efficacy of self 
protection leads to use of less persistent herbicides, but may increase application rates. We 
also consider the effects of increased uncertainty about window length or window efficacy on 
herbicide decisions. An increase in uncertainty about window length likely decreases 
application rates and increases persistence, while the implications of increased uncertainty 
about window efficacy are inconclusive without additional information. 
Our results from the third paper show that the concepts of self insurance and self 
protection in weed control can be put to practical use in constructing and comparing nonpoint 
pollution policies. In general, our results indicate that tax policies targeted on predicted 
groundwater exposure are cost-efficient and effective policy tools for improving groundwater 
quality. No single policy tool was found to be globally efficient for achieving improving both 
groundwater quality and surface water quality. Instead, our results indicate an efficient policy 
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set. We find that crude tools like bans and flat taxes are most efficient for achieving relatively 
large improvements in water quality, while herbicide targeted policies based on information 
about predicted exposure levels are most efficient for achieving relatively small improvements 
in water quality. 
These three papers have used a different approach to modeling weed control decisions 
under uncertainty than had been used in the past. The most unique feature in the papers has 
been the definition of herbicide strategies in terms of the windows of opportunity they allow 
for application and effectiveness. By defining herbicide strategies in this way, we have seen 
the choice between different types of herbicides as a choice involving the probability of 
outcomes. This extends the theory of herbicides as damage control, or self insurance inputs to 
the more general class of endogenous risk problems involving self protection as well as self 
insurance. This is significant in that it points out that herbicides may be used by producers in 
more than one way to deal with uncertainty, not simply to reduce the magnitude of losses 
when they occur, but to reduce the probability that a loss will occur. It is also significant 
because it has allowed us to model not only decisions involving the amount of herbicide that 
will be applied under ahernative policy scenarios and alternative levels of uncertainty, but also 
decisions involving the type of herbicide applied. 
Directions for Further Research 
There are several ideas for fiarther research that arise from these papers. The first is to 
extend the models to maximize expected utility rather than expected profit. Some preliminary 
work has already been done in this area using the output of the WISH model, but a detailed 
analysis has not yet been carried out. Adding risk aversion to the theoretical models would 
add some complication, but it would be interesting to see if some definitive predictions can be 
made regarding the combined effects of tastes and technology in an endogenous risk setting. 
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A second area for further research is to extend WISH to allow for variable herbicide 
application rates and fertilizer application rates. This would require modeling yearly changes 
in entire yield and damage functions. Currently we model yearly changes at only two points 
on each of two yield functions and we assume damage either occurs or does not occur. We 
do not allow for different levels of damage. While this would require a considerable modeling 
leap, it would provide valuable quantitative information for policy analysis and to test the 
implications of our theoretical models. 
A third area for further research is to consider the simultaneous decision of herbicide 
type and quantity with fertilizer quantity. The first and second papers only considered 
decisions involving two of these variables at a time. The addition of a third decision variable 
greatly complicates the analysis. In fact, such an analysis was not presented here because we 
were unable to derive meaningful implications from our model. However, with information 
generated by the extended WISH model discussed above or with more detailed agronomic 
data it may be possible to gain some insight into the effects that are likely to dominate. In this 
case the model would give a more complete picture of the tradeoffs among herbicide 
quantities, herbicide persistence and fertilizer quantities. 
A final area for flirther research is to extend,this endogenous risk approach to other 
production decisions. One such decision that is relevant to agriculture is the joint decision of 
crop planting date, seed variety and seeding rate. This is a clear case where the producer's 
decision is made as an effort to affect the probability distribution of outcomes. 
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